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‘IN SERVICE:10-8’ ENTERS 4th 
YEAR OF PUBLICATION 
 
“In Service: 10-8” is 
entering its fourth 
calendar year of 
publication. Issues are 
available from 2001, 
2002, 2003, and now 
2004. We are proud to report that the 
publication is read from coast to coast by some of 
Canada’s finest.  
 
By bringing important issues to you, particularly in 
the area of criminal and constitutional law and its 
application to front line law enforcement, it is our 
hope that the case summaries and other subjects 
will stimulate thought, discussion, and 
understanding. Based on the kind responses we 
have received to date from our readers, it has 
been realized that there are few resources in 
Canada that provide the service of this 
publication. Our unofficial motto is quite simply, 
“Keep Current and Stay Safe”.   
 
For the most part, contributors to the newsletter 
are operational law enforcement officers. People 
with hands on experience who have dealt with 
many of the concerns you may have.  Looking into 
the future, it is evident that we must continue as 
a body of professionals to commit ourselves to 
continuous educational development. This 
responsibility lies not only with our departments 
and training academies, but also on an individual 
basis! 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Humility is not thinking less of yourself, but 
thinking of yourself less—Rick Warren 
 
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
2004 CONFERENCE 
 
“Excellence in Policing 
Through Community Health, 
Organizational Performance 
and Personal Wellness” 
 
Location: 
 
The Westin Bayshore 
Vancouver, British Columbia 
 
 
Dates: 
 
April 5, 6 & 7, 2004 
 
Registration Fee: 
 
 $325  
(includes reception, 2 lunches and the 
banquet dinner) 
Advanced seminar/increment course 
additional $75  
 
Keynote Speakers: 
 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin  
Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
Mr. Gordon Graham 
LAPD Chief William J. Bratton  
RCMP Comm. Giuliano Zaccardelli  
 
Lunchtime Speakers: 
Mr. Joe Roberts 
 Honourable Garde Gardom 
 
Please check the Justice Institute of B.C. 
website for more information and details at 
www.policeleadership.org 
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POLICE LEADERSHIP  
2004 CONFERENCE 
APRIL 5-7, 2004 
 
Register soon, spaces are 
filling up! The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 
the Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are hosting the 2004 
Police Leadership Conference in beautiful 
Vancouver, British Columbia.  This is Canada’s 
largest police leadership conference and the 
theme for this year is Excellence in Policing 
through Community health, Organizational 
performance, and Personal wellness. The 
Conference will provide an opportunity for 
delegates to hear leadership topics discussed by 
lively and renowned keynote speakers.  
 
The Conference will be held April 5-7, 2004 at 
the beautiful and picturesque waterfront Westin 
Bayshore Resort & Marina. Register early as the 
2000 and 2002 conferences were sold out. Early 
registration is $325 before March 1, 2004. 
 
Keynote speakers: 
 
LAPD Chief William J. Bratton  
 
Appointed the 54th 
Chief of the Los Angeles 
Police Department, 
William J. Bratton 
oversees the operations 
of one of the largest 
major municipal law 
enforcement agencies in 
the United States.  His 
responsibilities include the supervision of 9,304 
sworn and 3,055 civilian employees with an annual 
budget of $927 million.  A strong advocate of 
transparent community policing that embraces 
partnership, problem solving and prevention, he 
initiated a major re-engineering of the Los 
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Angeles Police Department, moving towards a 
decentralized police bureaucracy with stronger 
area commands that are more responsive to local 
community needs, and better trained and 
motivated police officers. Chief Bratton's vision 
includes a comprehensive and assertive strategy 
for dramatically reducing crime, disorder, and 
fear in the largest metropolitan city on the West 
Coast.  Particular emphasis has been placed on 
gang-related crimes and the culture that creates 
it. 
 
Chief Bratton is a former New York Police 
Commissioner who led that department to a 39% 
decline in serious crimes and a 50% reduction in 
homicides.  He also initiated the internationally 
acclaimed COMPSTAT system - a computer driven 
management accountability process that is an 
integral part of his decentralized management 
philosophy.  It emphasizes a "management from 
the middle down" style that prioritized 
empowerment, inclusion, accountability, and the 
use of timely and accurate crime analysis to drive 
the organization. 
 
Chief Bratton is a graduate of the FBI National 
Executive Institute and was a Senior Executive 
Fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy 
School of Government. He is a past president of 
the Police Executive Research Forum, a frequent 
guest lecturer, writer and commentator, and is 
the co-author of his critically acclaimed Random 
House autobiography, "Turnaround."  Among his 
many other honours and awards, Chief Bratton 
holds the Schroeder Brother's Medal, which is 
the Boston Police Department's highest award for 
valour. 
 
Mr. Gordon Graham 
Gordon Graham is a 30 
year veteran of California 
Law Enforcement. He 
holds a Master's Degree 
in Safety and Systems 
Management from the 
University of Southern 
California, a Juris 
Doctorate from Western State University, and 
was awarded his teaching credential from 
California State University. His education as a 
Risk Manager and experience as a practicing 
Attorney, coupled with his extensive background 
in law enforcement, have allowed him to rapidly 
become recognized internationally as a dynamic 
presenter with multiple areas of expertise. 
 
Over the last decade, Mr. Graham has spoken to 
over 300,000 law enforcement and other public 
safety professionals from every state in the US. 
Since 1990, he consistently received the highest 
evaluations on California P.O.S.T critiques. In 
1995, Mr. Graham received the Governor's Award 
for Excellence in Law Enforcement Training, the 
highest tribute available in the critical mission of 
training police professionals. His penetrating wit 
coupled with his vast knowledge in multiple 
disciplines provides the enlightened listener, 
regardless of rank, with an information packed 
seminar that will benefit them in current and 
future assignments. 
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan  
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
joined the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary in 1970 
and was promoted 
through the ranks, 
attaining the post of 
Chief Constable in 
1996. In 1998 he 
received a Knighthood 
in the New Year Honours List. In 2002, Sir Ronnie 
retired from the police service and was appointed 
Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for 
London and the East Region and also the Ministry 
of Defence Police, UK Atomic Energy Authority 
Police, Guernsey, Jersey, the Sovereign Base in 
Cyprus and the Isle of Man. His portfolio 
responsibilities include Public Order, Terrorism, 
Ports and Special Branch, and Officer Safety. 
 
Sir Ronnie has travelled extensively in Europe and 
the United States to study policing methods. He 
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has attended all the major courses, including the 
Senior Command Course at the Police Staff 
College at Bramshill. Holding a Bachelor of Arts 
degree and a Master of Arts degree in 
Administration and Legal Studies, he is also a 
graduate of the FBI Academy. In 2002 Sir Ronnie 
was awarded a Knight Grand Cross of the Order 
of the British Empire in the Queen's Birthday 
Honours List.   
 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin 
 
A veteran of the U.S. 
Marine Corps, Dr. 
Gilmartin is a principal 
in Gilmartin, Harris and 
Associates, a 
Behavioural Sciences/ 
Management Consulting 
Company specializing in 
law enforcement/ public safety consultation. He 
holds a doctoral degree in clinical psychology 
from the University of Arizona and is the author 
of the book “Emotional Survival for Law 
Enforcement: A Guide for Officers and Their 
Families”. He holds adjunct faculty instructor 
positions with the University of Massachusetts 
Police Leadership Institute, and the Sam Houston 
State University Law Enforcement Management 
Institute of Texas. He is an instructor at the FBI 
Academy in Quantico, Virginia and a faculty 
member of the FBI Law Enforcement Executive 
Development Institute (LEEDS and EDI). He is 
also a guest instructor at the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 
He is retained by several Federal law 
enforcement agency critical incident response 
teams.  
 
Dr. Gilmartin formerly spent twenty years in law 
enforcement in Arizona. During his tenure, he 
supervised the agency’s Behavioural Sciences Unit 
and the Hostage Negotiations Team. He is a 
former recipient of an IACP-Parade Magazine 
National Police Officer Citation Award for 
contributions during hostage negotiations.  
 
RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli 
 
Commissioner Giuliano 
Zaccardelli joined the 
RCMP in 1970, and 
following recruit 
training was posted to 
Alberta where he 
performed a number of 
general policing duties. 
He was commissioned in 
1986 and was promoted to the rank of Deputy 
Commissioner, responsible for National 
Headquarters. In August 1999, Commissioner 
Zaccardelli assumed the newly created position of 
Deputy Commissioner, Organized Crime and 
Operational Policy.  
 
In 2000 Commissioner Zaccardelli officially 
became the 20th Commissioner of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. He holds a Bachelor of 
Commerce degree in Business Administration 
from Loyola College in Montreal and has 
completed the National Executive Institute 
Program at the FBI Academy in 1998. He is also a 
graduate of the Senior Command Course at 
Bramshill Police Staff College in England. 
 
Mr. Joe Roberts  
 
The most effective 
leaders in society are 
those rare individuals 
who can inspire their 
audience with a passion 
that can only come from 
personal experience. As 
the President and CEO 
of an extremely 
successful multimedia 
company, Joe Roberts has faced and overcome 
key business challenges, which confront every 
modern organization.  
 
Joe's business solutions have made millions of 
dollars for his clients, across a variety of 
business sectors. It is from this experience that 
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Joe draws when addressing Fortune 500 
companies, boards of trade and professional 
associates internationally. With a track record of 
proven business success, Joe formed his own 
multimedia company, Mindware Design 
Communications. In less than four years, he led 
his company to a phenomenal 800% increase in 
business, and made his first million in sales 
before he was 35.  
 
What is most amazing about this young man 
however is that in 1989 he was living on the 
streets as a homeless skid row derelict. Through 
perseverance, determination and his resilient 
human spirit, Joe pulled himself out of the 
darkness and despair, to become a highly 
respected business and community leader of 
today. Drawing on the tremendous courage and 
determination necessary for his dramatic 
personal transformation, Joe now uses his 
amazing story, insightful humour and solid 
business experience to inspire individuals and 
organizations to achieve their own remarkable 
goals! 
 
How did he do it? Joe overcame his hardship by 
studying what worked in the past.  By reading and 
researching great authors and business leaders 
he learned how to test and immediately apply 
usable life principles to his own growth. Today, 
Joe shares his life transforming techniques with 
his listeners in a step-by-step way that empowers 
audience members to achieve their goals.  
 
In his book, "7 Secrets to Profit from Adversity - 
Success Against All Odds", Joe maps out exactly 
how to profit from hard times.  His presentation 
of these principles with an exciting combination 
of inspiration, entertainment, and education is 
what makes Joe Roberts' programs so unique and 
effective.  As a result, he has become an 
internationally known and respected speaker on 
Managing Adversity and Change, Visionary Goal 
Setting and Professional Selling. 
 
Joe has established his professional speaking 
career working with major clients in both Canada 
and the United States. He has become a favourite 
at business conventions and corporate meeting 
events, captivating tens of thousands of people 
and receiving rave reviews! 
 
Advanced Seminar/ Increment Course 
 
Like years past, Police Leadership 2004 will be 
offering an additional two seminar days in 
conjunction with the Conference for an extra 
$75. Participants will attend the JIBC on April 5, 
the Westin Bayshore April 6 and 7 for the 
conference, and return again to the JIBC on April 
8, providing a full 4-day course. Dr. Darryl 
Plecas (EdD) and Dr. Greg Anderson (PhD) will be 
instructing and facilitating the additional 2 days.  
 
Keeping in line with the conference theme, Day 1 
of the advanced seminar will provide a general 
introduction and background to issues involving 
personal and organizational wellness.  This 
experience will heighten the participant’s 
awareness of key concepts, and allow them to 
take in and assimilate the information presented 
during the conference with a higher level of 
understanding.  The day following the conference 
will provide participants an opportunity to review 
the material presented during the conference 
during focus groups.  This day will also end with a 
discussion of specific issues emerging within 
policing today, including information on the 
physical demands of police work, use of force, 
firearms training and multi-tasking. Interested 
police officers are advised to check with their 
departmental training officers to determine 
whether the course is eligible for increment 
status. 
 
Dr. Darryl Plecas (EdD) is a 
professor in the Department 
of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice at the University 
College of the Fraser Valley 
(UCFV) where he is Chair and 
has worked since 1979. In 
2001 he was awarded UCFV’s 
Teaching Excellence Award and in 2003 he 
received an Innovative Excellence in Teaching, 
Learning and Technology Award at the 14th 
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International Conference on College Teaching and 
Learning.  
 
Dr. Plecas has served as an Associate of the 
International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and 
Criminal Justice Policy at the University of 
British Columbia, as an Expert Observer to the 
10th United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
and Treatment of Offenders, and on three 
occasions as an invited participant at the annual 
meetings of the United Nations Scientific and 
Professional Advisory Committee. He also served 
for three years as a member of the Correctional 
Service of Canada’s Audit Team on National 
Programs Accreditation. He is the book review 
editor for Police Practice and Research: An 
International Journal, and Chair of the planning 
committee for the 2004 International Police 
Executive Symposium. He is the author or co-
author of more than 80 research reports, 
international journal articles, and other 
publications addressing a broad range of criminal 
justice issues. He holds two degrees in 
criminology from Simon Fraser University, and a 
doctorate in Higher Education from the 
University of British Columbia.  In the summer of 
1995 he completed the Management Development 
Program in the Graduate School of Education at 
Harvard University. 
 
Dr. Greg Anderson (PhD) 
received a BPE and MPE in 
Exercise Science from the 
University of British 
Columbia, and a PhD in 
Kinesiology (Applied 
Physiology) from Simon 
Fraser University.  He has 
been involved in teaching at the post-secondary 
level since 1986 and is presently a Professor in 
Kinesiology and Physical Education at the 
University College of the Fraser Valley. 
 
Dr. Anderson’s research interests lie in applied 
areas – recently in research examining 
occupational fitness and occupational physiology 
of physically demanding occupations.  Examining 
issues within law enforcement agencies, he is well 
published in both pure science and practitioner 
journals on topics ranging from bona fide 
occupational testing, police officer stress, 
grooming standards for general duty police 
officers, to prediction of shooting scores from 
physical data. He has been an invited speaker at 
regional, provincial, national and international 
venues.  A passionate and enthusiastic speaker, 
Dr. Anderson enjoys translating “the science” for 
the practitioner, providing them with a better 
understanding of the fundamental theory behind 
popular practice. Recently, he received the 2003 
Canadian Society for Exercise Physiology, Health 
and Fitness Recognition Award.  
 
For more updates on this conference as they 
develop, please bookmark:  
 
www.policeleadership.org 
or contact the Police Leadership 2004 
Conference Coordinator Sgt. Mike Novakowski at 
604-528-5733, toll free 1-877-275-4333 ext. 
5733, or e-mail at mnovakowski.jibc.bc.ca. 
 
Hotel Reservations 
A block of rooms has been reserved for the 
Conference at the Westin Bayshore Resort and 
Marina located at 1601 Bayshore Drive, 
Vancouver. Delegates are responsible for booking 
their own rooms, but remember to state the 
"Police Leadership 2004 Conference" to receive 
the special conference rate. Because rooms are 
limited, early reservation is recommended.  
 
The Westin Bayshore 
hotel telephone: (604) 682-3377 
toll free: 1 800 WESTIN 1  
e-mail: bayshorereservations@westin.com 
website: www.westinbayshore.com 
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CURRENT POLICE LEADERSHIP  
2004 CONFERENCE SPONSORS 
 
Platinum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Silver 
 
Vancouver Police Union 
 
Mancom Manufacturing Inc. 
 
M/A-Com Private Radio Systems Canada 
Corp. 
 
Bronze 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you, or your business, are interested in 
becoming a Police Leadership 2004 Conference 
sponsor, please contact the Police Leadership 
2004 Conference Coordinator Sgt. Mike 
Novakowski at 604-528-5733, toll free 1-877-
275-4333 ext. 5733, or e-mail at 
mnovakowski.jibc.bc.ca. 
 
FINDING FUN IN 
FITNESS 
Cst. Kelly Keith 
 
13 Fitness Quick Tips 
 
1) After a hard workout, greatly help alleviate 
sore muscles the following day by trying a 
contrast shower. Run the shower at cold for 1 
minute. The shower should be on a hard pulse, 
if possible, and should cover your extremities, 
especially the parts you just worked out. Then 
alternate the temperature to warm (not hot) 
and do the same. Do a 3-minute rotation 
between each temperature and the muscle 
soreness will be greatly diminished. 
 
2) If your runs are getting boring, try shaking 
things up. Try school runs where you run from 
school to school and do a speed lap on their 
track, then onto the next school; a church run 
where you run hard around the block of the 
church; or race buses and, as a bus passes, 
try keeping up with it for as long as possible. 
 
3) Purchase some high tech, comfortable running 
clothing and you'll feel and act more like a 
runner. 
 
4) Don't miss the chance to train in miserable 
weather. You'll feel great afterwards and if 
you run a race in miserable weather, you'll be 
invincible. 
 
5) If you get blisters on your feet, try turning 
your socks inside out so the seams don't rub 
against your feet. 
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6) After your hard speed runs, try stretching 
immediately and then put some ice packs on 
your legs. 
 
7) When attempting to make progress in your 
running, biking, workout, etc., remember to 
take one step at a time. You need to inoculate 
your body gradually to the stress you’re 
asking it to adapt to. Try adding 5% per week 
to your long runs etc, or 5% weight increases 
to your lifts. 
 
8) Consider variety in your training. If you run, 
mix in some tempo runs, speed runs, and long 
steady runs each week. If you lift weights, 
change one exercise for every two body parts 
every work out, or change from dumbbells to 
barbells on a regular basis.  
 
9) Do Plyometrics. Plyometrics work great if you 
are trying to get stronger and/or faster. Use 
them at the end of your workout to ensure 
maximum benefit is gained. There are a 
number of books available that illustrate 
various plyometric techniques. Check them 
out. 
 
10) Don't have time to cook or need a quick 
healthy fix. Canned salmon / flavoured tuna, 
and beef jerky are great sources of protein. 
Fruit cocktail in real fruit juice, canned 
peaches—major carbs. Canned chicken thrown 
on a salad—quick and easy meal. Beans in 
tomato sauce—good protein and carb content. 
 
11) Is cholesterol a problem? Green tea is a 
heavyweight champ of a nutritional drink and 
it also helps lower cholesterol. 
 
12) Short on pre-exercise carb drink? Three 
tablespoons of honey is just as effective as 
any gel or drink. 
 
13) Double the benefit. Remember to lower the 
weight in total control. Lifting the weight to 
the desired level is only half the work. 
Studies have shown that the lowering, or 
negative phase, of the lift can be as good or 
even more important for muscle and strength 
gains. 
PROCLAMATION NOT 
NECESSARY FOR RIOT 
CONVICTION 
R. v. Greenhow, 2004 ABCA 22 
 
The accused was convicted at 
trial for participating in a riot, 
assaulting police, and assault 
with a weapon. He appealed his 
convictions to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that there was no valid riot 
proclamation under s.67 of the Criminal Code and 
therefore his conviction for participating in a riot 
under s.65 was improper.  
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal unanimously 
disagreed. Section 65 of the Criminal Code 
creates an offence for participating in a riot and 
only allows for a maximum punishment of two 
years imprisonment. Section 65 does not make 
any reference to s.67. Section 68, on the other 
hand, requires the proclamation under s.67 as an 
essential element and provides for a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment. Thus, compliance 
with s.67 (riot proclamation) is necessary for a 
conviction under s.68, but not s.65. The appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that of recent JIBC Police Academy recruits1:  
• the average age was 29 years old; 
• ages ranged from 21 years to 44 years; 
• 72% were male; 
• 52% had a university degree, 30% had a 
college diploma, 16% had some university or 
college, and 2% only had a high school 
education; and 
• 76% had no prior police experience, regular or 
reserve. 
                                                 
1 Novakowski, M. (2003) Exploring Field Training Within British Columbia’s 
Independent Police Agencies: It’s the Singer, Not the Song. Royal Roads University 
Thesis 
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‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
The “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter would like to 
share some of our 
readers’ comments about 
the publication. We 
appreciate the 
encouragement we have received and look forward 
to future editions: 
*************** 
As a field trainer I find your newsletter to be 
invaluable as an additional resource when taking 
on recruits. Please keep up the good work. Our job 
is often without praise and you should be 
commended on your work.”  Police Constable, 
British Columbia 
*************** 
“Please put me on your list to receive your In 
Service 10-8 newsletter. It is really excellent. I 
post it up for the members to read as I run two 
community police offices.” Police Constable, 
RCMP British Columbia 
*************** 
“I accidentally came across [an] issue of the In-
Service: 10-8 newsletter. I was delighted to see 
such a newsletter which highlights recent case 
laws detrimental to day to day police work. Keep 
up the excellent work.” Police Officer, RCMP 
Major Crime Unit British Columbia 
*************** 
“Could you please add me to your mailing list. They 
are very interesting and you obviously put a lot of 
work into their research. I really find it 
remarkable how the case law trends differ so 
dramatically over different geographic regions of 
the country! It seemed for a while the west was a 
source of bad case law, now it seems its us here in 
Ontario who are upsetting the apple cart.” Police 
Sergeant, Ontario 
*************** 
“I look back sometimes on my career and think 
how great it would have been to have timely 
information such as you are now providing for 
street officers. Without such updates the job 
becomes like playing a game- in which you find out 
what the rules were... after the game is over!” 
Retired Police Sergeant, Ontario 
*************** 
“I've read the latest 10-8 publication and found it 
to be most helpful!  Excellent resource and 
written in a manner that's easy to understand” 
Police Constable, RCMP British Columbia 
*************** 
“I only recently received a copy of this 
publication. My compliments on a fine newsletter. 
Could you please add me to your electronic 
distribution list for future issues.”  Deputy Chief 
Constable, British Columbia 
*************** 
“I am a Detective Constable…in Ontario.  I 
became aware of your publication on the internet 
and have been maintaining copies for review by 
our entire detective office.  I understand you 
conduct automatic dispatch of your publication via 
e-mail. Would you please consider the addition of 
my e-mail address to your current distribution 
program.”  Police Detective, Ontario 
*************** 
“Thanks once again for the excellent information 
you provided me. The case law summaries were 
especially helpful. I shared the information among 
my co-workers and it generated lots of lively 
discussion…Please place me on your e-mail 
distribution list. I am very interested in staying 
current with case law and any other aspects which 
impact on law enforcement” Police Constable, 
RCMP Nova Scotia 
*************** 
“I am in charge of Policy of our service, and, 
review case law for our service.  Your Newsletter 
is one of the better Canadian Newsletters I've 
come across.”  Police Constable, Manitoba 
*************** 
“I am the…Police Service Alcohol Coordinator and 
I found your information on Shuparski very 
informative.  I have passed that information on to 
our breath techs. Thanks.” Police Officer, 
Saskatchewan 
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‘OFFICER SAFETY SEARCH’ NOT 
TO BE USED AS FISHING 
EXPEDITION 
R. v. Bercier, 2003 MBQB 90 
 
The accused was asked for his 
drivers licence after being 
stopped by police for making an 
illegal turn at 3 am. However, he 
could only produce the picture 
part of his Manitoba driver’s licence, but not the 
second part certifying his status. The vehicle was 
not stolen, but a computer check showed the 
accused’s licence was expired and that he had an 
outstanding drug charge. The accused was asked 
to get out and pat searched before being placed 
in the back of the police car. A small hard, round 
bulge was detected in his underwear and the 
accused brushed the officer’s hand away to 
prevent the completion of the search. The police 
forcibly completed the search and found a small 
cloth drawstring bag containing drugs. The 
accused was charged with possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
 
At the accused’s trial in the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s bench, the officers testified they 
removed the accused from his vehicle as a matter 
of convenience. They admitted they did not have 
reasonable grounds the accused committed any 
offences other than Highway Traffic Act 
violations and said they searched the accused for 
officer safety reasons. Furthermore, they 
testified that in most cases the driver they wish 
to ticket is left in the vehicle and the ticket is 
delivered to them, unless they need to establish 
identity, prevent the continuation of the offence, 
there is a risk of flight, or the driver poses a 
danger. However, the officers admitted none of 
these factors were a concern in this stop.  
 
All warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable and the Crown bears the burden of 
proving that the search, in this case, was lawful, 
reasonable, and necessary. The Crown suggested 
that because the police could have arrested the 
accused without warrant under the Highway 
Traffic Act, but chose not to, they still 
nonetheless had the right to search him 
incidental to arrest. Such a circumstance has 
some times been referred to as a de facto arrest. 
Justice Scurfield disagreed, stating: 
 
Section 240(1) of The Highway Traffic Act 
conveys the right to arrest a person who has 
committed a violation, but not the obligation to 
do so. Rights and obligations flow from a 
decision to exercise the power of arrest.  In 
this case, the police officers testified that 
they did not arrest the accused, nor did they 
intend to do so before they conducted the 
search.  Consequently, even if the police 
officers had a valid power to arrest the 
accused, I am not inclined to accept an 
argument that the powers of search should be 
defined by what they could have done. 
 
Where a police officer chooses to detain a 
person as opposed to arresting them, it would 
be illogical for the courts to countenance the 
same degree of interference with the person's 
liberty as is recognized to follow a lawful 
arrest. 
 
Logically, the level of warrantless search that 
is permissible correlates partly to the 
categorization of the event as either a lawful 
arrest or detention.  Clearly the scope of a 
search following a lawful arrest has been 
recognized as broader than that generated by 
a mere detention…To the extent that R. v. 
Boyd (supra) treats a decision to detain as 
giving rise to a power to search that is 
identical to that which follows arrest simply 
because an officer could have arrested the 
accused, I am satisfied that it is no longer 
persuasive authority. [para. 16-18, references 
omitted] 
 
Furthermore, the court found the police did not 
have the right to search incidental to the 
accused’s detention. Even though the police had a 
right and duty under motor vehicle legislation to 
stop the accused, identify him, and issue him a 
ticket, this did not entitle the police to increase 
the intrusive of the detention and conduct a 
warrantless search for drugs. The court held: 
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In the case of a detention, the generation of a 
right to search should be limited by what is 
reasonably necessary for the police officer to 
complete the duty which he is then 
exercising…Further, the right to search is 
limited to situations where the police have an 
"articulable" cause for conducting the 
search.  There is no general power to search 
following a detention.  Police officers must be 
able to identify a reasonable basis for both 
the detention and any subsequent search.  The 
scope of such a search is clearly limited to 
what is reasonably necessary in order to 
complete the bona fide duty that the police 
officer is exercising at the time…By contrast, 
where there has been a lawful arrest, wider 
powers incident to that arrest have been 
acknowledged by the courts…  
 
If a search following a detention is necessary, 
then it is primarily justified by the object of 
preserving the peace and protecting 
life.  Consequently, the search of the detained 
person ordinarily should be limited to one for 
weapons… [para. 19-20, references omitted] 
 
Since the police could not articulate a reasonable 
necessity for escalating the level of detention nor 
provide reasonable grounds for performing the 
search, it was unreasonable under s.8 of the 
Charter and the evidence was ruled inadmissible 
pursuant to s.24(2). Here the police intentionally 
violated the accused’s rights and the judge was 
not willing to “condone the deliberate use of 
“officer safety searches” as a means of avoiding 
the obligation to obtain search warrants or as a 
justification for the arbitrary interference with 
the liberties of a citizen.” Moreover, the use of 
provincial legislation as a ruse to conduct a 
warrantless search supports exclusion of the 
evidence. 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
What matters in life is not how long we live, but 
how we live—Steve Berg 
POLICE HAVE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO INVESTIGATE SUSPICIOUS 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
R. v. Uhryn, 2003 SKPC 166 
 
A police officer, knowing the 
accused was a prohibited driver 
and having received an 
anonymous tip she might be 
found driving near a bar, spotted 
a vehicle similar to that driven by the accused in 
the area at 3 am and stopped it to perform a 
licence and registration check. The accused was in 
fact the driver and she was arrested, her vehicle 
was impounded, and she was released on an 
appearance notice. She was charged with driving 
while disqualified under the Criminal Code but 
argued at her trial in Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court that she was arbitrarily detained under s.9 
of the Charter.  
 
Under Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act, a 
police officer is empowered to randomly stop 
motorists and check for driver’s licences, even 
without a suspicion or reasonable belief that the 
driver has done anything wrong. Arbitrary traffic 
stops are a justifiable breach of a person’s rights 
under s.1 of the Charter as long as the officer is 
in the lawful execution of their duties. Provincial 
Court Justice White described the power to 
detain as follows: 
 
In practical terms what this means is that if a 
police officer wishes to stop a vehicle based 
upon a highway traffic safety matter or to 
check the license of the driver and the 
registration of the vehicle, he/she has an 
unfettered right to do so…Likewise, if there 
exists a legitimate concern for enforcement of 
the criminal law then the officer may legally 
detain a vehicle.  
 
The point is that the detention of a motor 
vehicle is only illegal if it is done on a whim 
without any articulable cause that relates to 
the duties and responsibilities of the police 
officer. If the decision is made to stop a 
vehicle and if the purpose is related to his or 
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her duties as a police officer then, as a matter 
of law, the police officer is acting lawfully in 
the execution of his/her duties and 
responsibilities.   
 
Problems have arisen in cases where vehicle 
stops have been made in high crime areas (also 
referred to as "trouble spots") and the police 
have been unable to say why they decided to 
stop the vehicle…Alternatively, the issue 
arises in those cases where the police use the 
pretext of stopping a vehicle to check for 
license and registration to satisfy their 
curiosity… 
 
Our courts have made it abundantly clear that 
these types of activities are illegal and violate 
rights of citizens under the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and that the usual remedy of 
exclusion of evidence will be allowed pursuant 
to Section 24(2) in such circumstances. There 
must be at a minimum "articulable cause" for 
the detention… [paras. 17-20, references 
omitted] 
 
In this case, the detention was lawful for several 
reasons. Justice White stated: 
 
Clearly, he had articulable…cause to stop the 
vehicle and investigate the matter further. A 
police officer not only has a right but also a 
duty and responsibility imposed by law to make 
enquiries when confronted with suspicious 
circumstances. The police have a positive duty 
to enquire into circumstances that might have 
the potential for criminal activity. Surely, that 
is exactly why police officers go on routine 
patrols of their designated territory. Police 
officers must as a matter of course attempt 
to determine the identities of people where 
there are suspicious circumstances and they 
must also take active steps to prevent the 
commission of criminal offences or the 
continuation of a criminal offence. If a police 
officer's suspicions are satisfied then he/she 
must cease his enquiries if he/she wishes to 
duly execute his or her duties…However where 
the suspicions are not put to rest then the 
investigation must continue and this is clearly 
authorized by the law.  
 
The police officer herein had a well-grounded 
suspicion of criminal activity which was 
confirmed upon further routine investigation. 
He also had the additional power granted to 
him by the Highway Traffic Act to detain and 
question about license and identity which he 
does not normally have absent suspicious 
circumstances which is the prerequisite 
condition to making further enquiries in the 
non-vehicular context…The police officer in 
the instant case had reasonable suspicion, 
articulable cause and statutory authority to 
make the detention and subsequent arrest in 
this case. [paras. 26-27, references omitted] 
 
There was no breach of the accused’s Charter 
rights and she was convicted. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
IMPAIRED OBSERVATIONS 
ARISING FROM ROUTINE 
VEHICLE STOP LAWFUL 
R. v. Malekoff, 2003 SKQB 455 
 
A police officer on routine patrol 
in the early morning hours 
stopped a vehicle after 
observing its tires spin on the 
gravel as it started up from a 
stop at an intersection. The officer smelled a 
strong odour of liquor from the driver who 
admitted to having 5 or 6 beers, the most recent 
about 5 minutes prior to the stop. The officer 
detained the accused for an impaired driving 
investigation and waited 14 minutes before a 
roadside screening sample was taken. The accused 
failed and he subsequently provided two breath 
samples with readings of 190mg% and 200mg%. 
The accused was charged with driving over 
80mg% and convicted in Saskatchewan Provincial 
Court, but appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench arguing, among other grounds, that 
the trial judge erred in finding that he had not 
been arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the 
Charter and that the certificate of breath 
samples should have been excluded. 
 
Justice Maher dismissed the accused’s appeal. An 
arbitrary detention under s.40(8) of 
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Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act is 
authorized and saved by s.1 of the Charter 
provided its purpose is related to vehicle 
operation or road safety issues and is conducted 
by an identifiable police officer in the lawful 
execution of their duties. Furthermore, the 
officer is not precluded from investigating other 
offences arising from the detention that would 
not have otherwise been discovered but for the 
arbitrary stop. In this case, the officer was 
entitled to stop the accused’s vehicle and check it 
for spinning its tires on gravel without infringing 
s.9 of the Charter.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
MARIHUANA ODOUR PROVIDES 
REASONABLE GROUNDS TO 
OPEN BRIEFCASE 
R. v. Gallie, 2003 SKPC 158 
 
Several police officers executed 
a Criminal Code search warrant 
at the accused’s residence 
looking for stolen property (a 
television with remote, a Sony Playstation with 
games, and a Nintendo 64).  A search plan had 
been devised so that the search would be 
thorough, efficient, and systematic, rather than 
random. As such, certain police officers were 
assigned specific areas to search. The accused 
was in the residence and pointed out some of the 
articles mentioned in the warrant. She was 
arrested and then taken to the police station.  
 
As the search continued, an officer located a 
locked briefcase in the living room sitting against 
a wall. He picked up the briefcase, shook it, and 
noted that it smelled strongly of marihuana. He 
was not aware that any of the games had been 
located so thought it possible that they might be 
inside. The lock was broken open and the officer 
found 32 baggies of marihuana, $300 cash, and 
$70 cash in a wallet. A purse was also found in a 
bedroom containing $150 cash, a baggie of 
marihuana cigarettes, five baggies of marihuana, 
some hashish, and a notebook.  The search was 
concluded once the television remote control had 
been found. 
 
At her trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court, the 
accused submitted that her right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure 
protected under s.8 of the Charter had been 
violated because the police conducted the search 
in an improper manner by unreasonably extending 
it, which eventually led to the discovery of the 
brief case and purse contents.  She argued that 
all of the items listed in the warrant had been 
surrendered by her or could have been easily 
located by the police with reasonable diligence. In 
her view, the search warrant did not allow the 
police to rummage for things of interest or to 
search and seize at will.  
 
Justice Kolenick upheld the search and seizure. 
The officer had focused his attention on the 
briefcase as a possible receptacle of stolen 
property when he noticed that it smelled of 
marihuana. He was not aware of the presence of 
marihuana until he picked up the briefcase and it 
was at this point he concluded it may contain 
illicit drugs in addition to stolen property. By 
shaking the briefcase and hearing something 
inside, as well as relying on his sense of smell, the 
officer properly concluded it might well contain 
marihuana, stolen property, or both. “As such, 
pursuant to s.489(1) of the Criminal Code he had 
reasonable grounds to search the contents of the 
brief case for possible evidence of unlawful 
conduct,” ruled the judge. Further, this all 
happened in advance of the remote control being 
found, which ultimately terminated the search. 
Thus, there was no breach of the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights and her application for a remedy 
was dismissed.   
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Nothing gives one person so much advantage over 
another as to remain always cool and unruffled 
under all circumstances—Thomas Jefferson 
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CLAIM AGAINST JP REQUIRES 
MALICE or BAD FAITH 
Pispidikis v. Scroggie et al.,  
(2003) Docket: C39417 (OntCA) 
 
The plaintiff brought a civil 
action for wrongful arrest and 
imprisonment against several 
defendants, including a justice 
of the peace, two correctional officers and the 
Crown. The plaintiff had pleaded guilty in front of 
a justice of the peace to driving with a suspended 
licence under Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act and 
received a $1,000 fine plus $5 in court costs, 
with one year to pay. The record of the sentence, 
however, recorded “1 year” beside the phrase 
“sentenced to imprisonment for”, rather than 
next to the phrase “time to pay.” Later, the 
justice of the peace erroneously signed a 
committal warrant for the one year imprisonment 
and the plaintiff was arrested and taken to jail 
where he remained for a week until an emergency 
appeal was heard at which time the charges were 
withdrawn. 
 
At a motions hearing in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, the actions against the justice 
of the peace, the correctional officers, and the 
Crown were struck. The plaintiff appealed this 
decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal, however, 
the appeal was dismissed. Immunity will be 
afforded judicial officials acting in their duties 
unless it can be proven they acted out of malice 
or bad faith. In this case, there was no support 
for or evidence of malice or bad faith.  Similarly, 
there was no basis to interfere with the other 
decision to strike the claim against the 
correctional officers or the Crown. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
When the eyes say one thing, and the tongue 
another, a practiced man relies on the language of 
the first—Ralph Waldo Emerson 
CONFESSIONS RULE NOT ONLY 
METHOD OF STATEMENT 
EXCLUSION 
R. v. Wells, 2003 BCCA 242 
 
The accused was charged with 
sexual offences involving two 
young boys. The Crown sought to 
enter a statement made to the 
father of one of the victims 
which was obtained after he learned of the sexual 
allegations and had a violent confrontation with 
the accused, at one point punching him in the eye, 
pulling his hair, and holding a foot-long knife to 
his throat. During the altercation, the father told 
the accused he owed an apology to the children 
and marched him down the hallway of the home. 
The accused apologized to the children, told them 
it was not their fault, what he did was wrong, and 
that he would never do it again. At one point the 
accused tried to hug one of the children, but the 
father pulled him back and said if he ever 
touched the child again he would kill him.  
 
At his trial, the accused denied touching the 
children. Rather, he said the victim’s father made 
him apologize. During the trial voir dire, the judge 
concluded that “no matter how brutal the 
circumstances of the extraction of these 
statements from [the accused] were, they do 
not…meet or come anywhere close to satisfying 
me that they were made to a person in authority.” 
The accused was convicted on two counts of 
sexual touching under s.151 of the Criminal Code, 
but appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in excluding 
the statements. He submitted that the admission 
of the statements in these circumstances would 
violate his s.11(d) Charter right to a fair trial as 
well as offend his right to liberty under s.7. In 
the accused’s view, regardless of the common law 
confessions rule, a statement can still be 
excluded under s.24(1) of the Charter or by a 
judge’s common law discretion.  
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Justice Rowles, writing for the unanimous appeal 
court, noted that the common law confessions 
rule requires that an out of court statement made 
to a person in authority will only be admissible if 
the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the statement was voluntary. The rule necessarily 
requires that the receiver of the statement be a 
person in authority. In other words, statements 
made to private citizens under circumstances of 
violence and oppression need not be proven to be 
voluntary. However, not all confessions made to 
persons not in authority need be admitted.  
 
Confessions obtained as a product of violence or 
threats of violence by persons not in authority 
present concerns about reliability and an accused 
may face a substantial risk of prejudice by a 
statement that should be given little, if any, 
weight. Further, if a statement was obtained in 
such circumstances and the potential prejudicial 
effect in admitting the statement is outweighed 
by its probative value, it is open to a court to 
exclude the statement. As Justice Rowles stated, 
“Charter guarantees of trial fairness and 
fundamental justice may prompt exclusion of 
evidence regardless of whether the traditional 
common law confessions rule would reach the 
opposite result.” 
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal applied the 
curative provision of s.686(1)(b)(iii) of the 
Criminal Code. Here, the trial judge chose not to 
make the accused’s statements or apologies part 
of his reasoning process in concluding that Crown 
had established his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
When someone is injured while in police custody, 
the conduct of the police invites immediate 
suspicion and exacting scrutiny.  The police have 
the onus of establishing that the use of force was 
lawful and not excessive.2—Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice Lane  
                                                 
2 Peart v. Peel Police Services Board [2003] O.J. No. 2669 (OntSCJ) 
SEALING HOSPITAL BLOOD 
SAMPLES NOT UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Gettins,  
(2003) Docket:C34768 (OntCA) 
 
The police responded to a fatal 
motor vehicle accident where 
the passenger in the accused’s 
vehicle died after a rear end 
collision with a dump truck. A police officer 
investigating whether alcohol was a factor in the 
accident attended the hospital where the accused 
was transported for treatment, but the attending 
emergency room physician would not allow for a 
breathalyser test. The officer then placed seals 
on four of five vials of blood that had been drawn 
from the accused by medical staff and they were 
subsequently placed in a refrigerator. A search 
warrant was then obtained and executed the next 
day.  
 
The blood was analyzed and admitted as evidence 
in the accused’s trial on charges of impaired 
driving causing death and over 80mg%. The 
accused appealed his convictions to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
placement of the seals on the vials infringed his 
rights protecting him from unreasonable search 
or seizure under s.8 of the Charter. He submitted 
that the actions of the police in sealing the vials 
were not authorized by law and therefore tainted 
the subsequent search warrant. Therefore, he 
suggested the evidence should have been 
excluded under s.24(2).  
 
Justice Weiler, for the unanimous appeal court, 
agreed that the placement of the seals amounted 
to a seizure under the Charter. Nevertheless, the 
seizure was held to be reasonable. There was no 
interference with the accused’s physical, spatial, 
or informational privacy interests.  Justice 
Weiler stated: 
 
[P]lacing [Centre of Forensic Science] seals on 
vials of the [accused’s] blood involves no 
interference with the spatial aspect of the 
[accused’s] privacy interests. There was no 
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intimidation or interference with the 
[accused’s] dignity. The doctor and nurses in 
the hospital already knew that [the officer] 
was investigating the accident to see if alcohol 
was involved. There was no interference with 
the [accused’s] physical integrity because the 
blood had already been taken. The police 
officer's actions were brief, limited to sealing 
the vials of the accused's blood, and the vials 
remained under the control of the hospital in 
the event they were needed for medical 
purposes. [para. 17] 
 
Nor was there any ““use” of the [accused’s] blood, 
in the sense that any information was obtained 
from it, prior to the search warrant being 
obtained”, ruled the court. Moreover, even if 
there was a s.8 violation, Justice Weiler 
nonetheless would have found the evidence 
admissible under s.24(2). Assuming there was a 
breach, it was not serious, was committed in good 
faith, and the accused was not compelled to 
participate in the creation of the blood because it 
had already been taken. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
UNDERCOVER COPS ARE NOT 
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY FOR 
CONFESSIONS RULE 
R. v. Grandinetti, 2003 ABCA 307 
 
The police commenced a five-
month undercover operation to 
obtain evidence from the 
accused who had become the 
principal suspect in the murder 
of his aunt. The officers, posing as members of a 
criminal organization, recruited the accused and 
gained his confidence and trust. They engaged 
him in various criminal activities, including money 
laundering, theft, receiving illegal firearms, and 
drug dealing, and encouraged him to talk about his 
role in the murder because, as they told him, they 
needed to ensure none of the organization’s 
members were under police investigation. He was 
also told that the boss of the organization had 
the ability to divert suspicion from him because 
certain police officers, including the lead 
investigator in his aunt’s murder, were employed 
and controlled by the criminal organization and 
could assist in destroying evidence. The accused 
believed the crime boss had sufficient control 
over the police investigation into his aunt’s 
murder and therefore could influence the 
prosecution by having witnesses and physical 
evidence disappear.  He ultimately confessed to 
his involvement in the murder, provided details, 
and took them to the scene of the crime.  
 
At his trial, the judge concluded that the 
undercover officers were not persons in authority 
and therefore a voir dire to determine the 
admissibility of the statements was unnecessary. 
His statements were admitted and the accused 
was convicted of first-degree murder. However, 
he appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that that the trial 
judge erred in concluding that the undercover 
officers were not persons in authority and also 
that the accused was detained and that his right 
to silence was violated.  
 
Persons in authority-who did the accused 
think he was talking to? 
 
The common law confession rule requires the 
Crown prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
statement made to a person in authority is 
voluntary. If this burden is not met, the 
statement is excluded as evidence. A person in 
authority is not simply someone who merely 
exerts authority over another person, but instead 
someone who is believed to be allied with state 
authorities and can influence an investigation or 
prosecution against the accused. In other words, 
the giver of the statement (accused) must believe 
that the receiver of the statement is acting as an 
agent of the police and is under police control.  
 
In this case, the undercover officers did not 
satisfy the definition of a person in authority. 
Rather, the accused believed that he was dealing 
with persons controlling corrupt police officers 
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who, acting contrary to their duties, may well 
sabotage the investigation into his aunt’s murder.  
In dismissing the person in authority argument, 
Justice McFayden for the majority wrote: 
 
[The accused] believed that he was dealing 
with members of a criminal organization, which 
he voluntarily joined, who might be able to 
assist him through their control of corrupt 
police officers acting outside their lawful 
duties. At no time did he suggest that he 
believed the members of the organization 
were acting on behalf of the police and could 
influence the prosecution as agents of the 
police.  
 
Detention & the Right to Silence 
 
A person may be detained even though they are 
not under arrest or physical restraint. A Charter 
detention can arise “when a police officer or 
other agent of the state assumes control over 
the movement of a person by a demand or 
direction which may have significant legal 
consequence and which prevents or impedes 
access to counsel” (R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
613). A person’s sense of compulsion for the 
purpose of a detention can also occur if they 
submit or acquiesce to the deprivation of their 
liberty when they reasonably believe they have no 
choice but to do so. This has been referred to as 
“psychological detention”.  
 
The accused argued that he was a psychological 
captive of the undercover officers because he 
was told he risked death if he walked away from 
the criminal organization. The majority of the 
court rejected the accused’s contention that he 
was detained. The police had not assumed control 
over the accused nor did he believe the 
undercover officers were the police. Nor was 
there any criminal liability if the accused refused 
to comply with the undercover officers or any of 
their demands. The accused did not believe the 
undercover officers were acting in any official 
capacity as police officers or other state agents 
and therefore the principle of psychological 
detention did not apply.  
 
The right to silence protected under s.7 of the 
Charter was not engaged either. The right to 
silence only arises after detention, when a person 
is under the control of state authorities who 
maintain the superior power imbalance in the 
detention relationship. In undercover operations, 
such as this case, the accused was not under the 
control of the state. Pre-detention undercover 
operations do not trigger a right to silence 
protection. Since there was no detention, the 
trial judge did not err in concluding that there 
was no violation of the accused’s right to silence.  
 
A Different View 
 
Justice Conrad, in dissent, found that the trial 
judge erred in concluding that an undercover 
police officer can never be a person in authority 
unless an accused reasonably perceives that the 
undercover officers can influence the 
investigation or prosecution and are acting for 
the state objective of promoting justice, rather 
than thwarting it. In this case, Justice Conrad 
found there was some evidence to show a 
reasonable perception that the undercover 
officers were sufficiently connected to the police 
officers investigating the murder that they could 
influence or control the investigation. In her view, 
a voir dire should have been held and she would 
have ordered a new trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
ARRESTEE MUST SEEK 
COUNSEL, OTHERWISE POLICE 
MAY BEGIN QUESTIONING 
R. v. Green, 2003 BCCA 639 
 
The accused, a part time 
employee of a bottle depot, was 
arrested for theft over $5,000 
after her supervisor reported 
the misappropriation of funds to the police. She 
was read her s.10(b) Charter rights and 
acknowledged that she understood. When asked 
if she wanted to contact a lawyer she said, “Can I 
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think about that?” The officer told her she could 
and also informed her of her right not to say 
anything. She was transported to the police 
station and was left alone in an interview room for 
a few minutes. The officer returned to the room 
and said, “You are aware about your rights 
regarding legal counsel”, but the accused made no 
indication that she wanted to call a lawyer. A 
statement was then obtained from the accused 
confessing to stealing the monies from the bottle 
depot.  
 
At her trial, the judge found no s.10 Charter 
violation and ruled the statement admissible. In 
the judge’s view, the officer properly advised the 
accused of her Charter rights at the time of her 
arrest and again reminded her of those rights at 
the station. Had she asked to speak to a lawyer 
she would have been provided a reasonable 
opportunity to do so, but she did not. The 
informational components of s.10, the judge held, 
had been satisfied. The accused appealed the 
admission of the statement to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that her rights 
under s.10 of the Charter had been violated.  
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal found no 
error in the trial judge’s decision and unanimously 
dismissed the appeal. In citing case law, the court 
noted that a person who is detained by the police 
and has been informed of their right to counsel 
does not have to speak to a lawyer. Therefore, 
once a detainee has been properly advised of 
their right to counsel, the onus shifts to them to 
assert a desire to call a lawyer. Until such a 
desire is communicated to the police, there is no 
duty on the police to provide a reasonable 
opportunity and facilitate access to counsel. The 
police are not required to assume or guess that a 
person will call a lawyer. Hence, when no desire to 
contact a lawyer is expressed the police may 
proceed with their investigation and, as in this 
case, take a statement without breaching the 
accused’s right to counsel.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
ETHICS-BASED POLICING… 
UNDOING ENTITLEMENT 
Dr. Kevin Gilmartin, PhD 
 
One of the greatest 
challenges facing law 
enforcement administrators 
today is the creation and 
maintenance of a values-
based agency consisting of 
an ethical cadre of officers and supervisors that 
represent the values of society. Many issues arise 
that make the maintenance of ethical employees a 
difficult task. One major challenge to maintaining 
an ethical/values-based agency is that over the 
course of a police career every department can 
expect its officers to be exposed on a daily basis 
to individuals and situations that violate the 
values these officers hold central. This exposure 
over time can be expected to leave an emotionally 
corrosive impact. To assist in the goal of creating 
values-based police agencies, one of the primary 
areas of study of the law enforcement behavioral 
sciences for more than two decades has been the 
refinement of pre-employment selection 
techniques that bring values-based individuals to 
the starting point of a police career. Screening 
protocols from psychological test batteries to 
interactive video assessment instruments have 
assisted agencies in selecting men and women who 
have the skills and values to potentially become 
successful police officers. These individuals begin 
their careers able to not only successfully 
complete the multiple task demands required of a 
police officer, but to present personal 
backgrounds reflective of well developed values 
systems congruent with those of society. For the 
law enforcement administrator, the challenge of 
the selection of competent and ethical police 
candidates may be significantly less demanding 
than the maintenance of a values-based police 
agency. 
 
To become a law enforcement officer is not an 
easy task. Intellectual, psychological, and 
background reviews are completed that many 
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times require the officer applicant to wait 
months, if not years, to determine if they are 
successful in obtaining a position in the basic 
police academy. Once selected to attend the 
academy, the applicant faces further academy 
screening and testing. Demanding academic, 
physical, and discipline challenges continue to 
reduce the number of recruits who eventually 
graduate the academy. Even then, after 
successful completion of months of an academy 
curriculum, a Field Officer Training Program thins 
the ranks even further of those hoping to 
successfully complete the probationary period 
and have the opportunity to serve their 
respective communities as police officers. With 
the exception of a small number of professions in 
our society, very few other career fields demand 
more to obtain an entry level position than law 
enforcement. Even with these highly selective 
screening measures in place, why does the field of 
law enforcement experience the headline cases of 
wrongful acts perpetrated by officers that 
potentially taint the entire profession? Are these 
cases of "Bad Apples" that should never have 
been officers and are selection failures, or can 
the experience of being a law enforcement 
officer change the existing values structure of 
the officer? Can this change cause an 
abandonment of "Core" ethical values by officers 
and permit the development of rationalized 
"Situational Ethics"? 
 
The selection of values-based individuals at the 
entry level appears to have been successfully 
completed by most law enforcement agencies over 
the past 20 years. The maintenance of values-
based individuals in police work, however has not 
been a major focus of attention either by law 
enforcement executives or behavioral 
researchers until quite recently. 
 
In an effort to reduce ethical violations by 
officers, agencies continue to address the issue 
of inappropriate officer behavior patterns by 
utilizing primarily a reactive investigative model. 
Although clearly the thorough investigation of 
inappropriate acts committed by officers is an 
absolute necessity, it does not reflect a complete 
management intervention strategy to reduce 
wrongful police acts. The reactive investigative 
prong needs to be augmented by a proactive 
values maintenance" prong designed to provide 
officers with the necessary information and 
insights to maintain core based values. These 
interventions would need to take place at routine 
intervals over the course of a police career and 
not limited to only entry level academy lectures. 
 
In attempting to create values-based law 
enforcement agencies, the profession demands 
review of the dynamics that create officers who 
willfully violate the values structures they 
possessed at the time of career entry. Viewing 
officer values or ethics as a never changing 
photograph taken at the time of entrance into 
the career, inappropriately permits ethical 
violations to be viewed as poor pre-employment 
selection decisions and misses the essential 
elements of most inappropriate police behavior 
patterns. In reviewing the factors that permit 
ethical violation to occur within a law 
enforcement agency, no singular determining 
causative factor exists that generates these 
behavior patterns. There does however, exist 
several central traits that provide fertile ground 
for the development of ethical deterioration at 
all levels of the rank structure. 
 
One of the central traits to values deterioration 
is the development of a culture of perceived 
"Entitlement". This belief would permit law 
enforcement officers to rationalize and justify to 
themselves behavior that is clearly unacceptable 
and would warrant enforcement action if engage 
in by members of the community at large. The 
belief that unrealistic expectations of favorable 
treatment or privileges being granted embodies 
entitlement. Entitlement can take many forms and 
can appear at initial review to be a relatively 
benign issue. Closer scrutiny can demonstrate the 
essential malignant nature of entitlement. 
Entitlement is the belief that an individual by 
virtue of his/her position as a law enforcement 
officer is owed certain privileges or latitudes in 
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terms of their behavior, "those rules really don't 
apply to us". The old military adage of "rank has 
it's privileges" would represent one example of 
"Entitlement" that appears to be accepted within 
that culture and possibly is only an expression 
that certain positions of authority are afforded 
additional respect in proportion to additional 
responsibility. In law enforcement, however, like 
any other authority based system, the potential 
for the abuse of authority exists and requires 
consistent vigilance for prevention. When the 
concept of entitlement is transferred to the law 
enforcement culture, it can take the form of "as 
cops we deserve ‘Professional Courtesy’"; "Speed 
limits don't apply to us"; " as a commander my 
secretary can do my personal typing"; or "as the 
Chief, I can play golf instead of attending the 
conference, even though I'm attending the 
conference at the communities expense". Each of 
these statements is the embodiment of 
entitlement. A belief develops that "you owe us 
cops for all we put up with on the streets to serve 
and protect you". Pride in being able to serve as a 
member of a given police agency is not 
entitlement. The belief that as a member of a 
police agency “we're special and the rules don't 
apply to us" is however, "Entitlement".  
 
When attempting to discuss values many law 
enforcement agencies, unfortunately, have not 
discussed the concept of the possible existence 
of a belief of entitlement in their agencies, but 
rather have instead focused on such issues as the 
acceptance of gratuities or other potentially 
controversial behaviors. When an agency focuses 
it's attention on the question of what is an 
inappropriate behavior or gratuity without 
discussing entitlement it bypasses the more 
fundamental question for the officers to answer. 
Without discussing entitlement the agency losses 
an opportunity for officers to understand and 
discuss the potential impact of the gratuity 
question and its impact on core values for the 
police officer. Lecturing working police officers 
about the evils of gratuities and how they lead to 
the "slippery slope" of corruption will usually be 
met with sarcastic sighs and closed minds. 
Discussing entitlement provides officers the 
information necessary to conceptualize 
independent values-based decisions. Whether or 
not the free cup of coffee is a harmless 
expression of appreciation by a member of the 
community or represents a contingent gratuity 
such as; "if I keep the cops in my restaurant the 
added security is good for business" is actually a 
moot point for officers trained in core values 
maintenance. The more appropriate questions for 
a police administrator would be, by permitting the 
members of the department to accept free 
coffee or reduced priced meals are we permitting 
to be created a belief system in the officers that 
they warrant a different standard of 
accountability than the general population. 
Secondly, it should be asked if a different 
standard of accountability does exist, is it one 
where the officers are less accountable for their 
behavior than the general community. Many a 
police administrator that would consider reduced 
priced meals inappropriate would permit officers 
to accept "special prices for law enforcement" 
for cellular phones or pagers without a second 
notice. The law enforcement administrator would 
also need to evaluate if a sense of "Entitlement" 
is being cultivated within the departmental 
hierarchy, and expressed as an extension of the 
military "rank-to-privileges" relationship. "As a 
commander I can bend the rules, but you folks 
down the chain better behave", represents in-
house entitlement in operation. 
 
How does entitlement develop and become 
institutionalized across levels of rank/status 
within agencies? Law enforcement by its nature is 
required to perform tasks the majority of society 
cannot or will not perform. The tasks can range 
from dealing with violent situations, responding to 
tragic events, or dealing with the most unsavory 
aspects of society. Officers, by seeing 
themselves dealing with situations that they alone 
must handle and control, learn early in a police 
career that the position permits them authority 
to transgress certain social norms to perform job 
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duties. Impacting freedom of movement of 
citizens, ingress and egress into citizen's private 
homes, emergency movement due to exigent 
circumstances that permit traffic laws to be 
suspended, even the capacity/responsibility to 
make lethal force decisions are part of the 
officers regular routine. Being exposed on a 
regular basis to "special authority" and at the 
same time being exposed on a daily basis to that 
element of society that operates without values, 
combines to severely challenge an officer's core 
values system. Unchecked authority operating in 
an ethical vacuum is a central component of all 
police corruption. 
 
The movement away from core values is not a 
difficult transition for officers working in many 
settings in our society. "What harm is there in 
accepting a free meal compared to the carnage 
these suspects at my last call just dealt to 
society?", is a realistic appraisal of the situational 
relativity of values. It severely challenges 
officers to maintain their essential "Core" values. 
"Situational" or "Relative" values or ethics are 
often times the path of least resistance. "Before 
I became a cop I had no idea this kind of stuff 
went on", can become the foundation for 
rationalizing what initially appears to be harmless 
rule violations. The change in values-based 
decisions by police officers can be outlined by a 
"Continuum of Compromise" ranging from "Acts of 
Omission" typified by not performing seemingly 
petty tasks to "Acts of Commission" including the 
active violation of administrative rules and 
possibly ultimately criminal violations. This 
compromise begins with the onset of a change in 
the manner in which officers explain or 
rationalize minor rule violations. The officer's 
newly acquired behavior patterns begin with a 
reappraisal of values relative to the environment 
in which the officers operate. "Because of all the 
garbage we put up with on the streets, what's the 
big deal about a little speeding or a free meal" 
can become an expression of situational values 
comparison. Entitlement is the precursor belief 
that leads to wrongful acts ranging from minor to 
felonious. Entitlement spans the rank structure. 
Many times the best examples of entitlement can 
be found at the top of the organizational chart. 
The chief who disciplines an officer for accepting 
a free meal, yet plays golf with greens fees that 
are paid for by a member of the community is 
clearly expressing a double standard and loudly 
proclaiming the instruction "Do as I say not as I 
do", rendering hollow any attempts to create and 
maintain a values based agency. Police executives 
that operate under the double standard in terms 
of entitlement are doomed in attempts to create 
values-based agencies and are viewed cynically by 
rank and file as little more than generating sound 
bites for the local media. This command 
perspective lends itself to "Politics-based" 
policing as opposed to "Values-based" policing. 
Often times the executive level capacity to 
rationalize "special" ethical decisions due to 
political exigency is no different than the street 
officer rationalizing inappropriate actions for 
more tangible or earthy reasons. 
 
A culture of entitlement is only reduced by a 
culture of ethical accountability. Accountability 
needs to be both self-initiated and 
organizationally-generated. The capacity to 
rationalize a lack of both individual and 
organizational accountability can be directly 
linked to what degree officers perceive 
themselves as being victimized by the 
deteriorating values of the community they police. 
If the officer is exposed on an increasing basis to 
violence and a generalized lack of social order it 
becomes easier to perceive wrong doing as 
harmless relative to the general level of 
community deterioration. The officer can readily 
rationalize that "Extreme situations demand 
extreme measures". Brutality, lack of 
truthfulness in reporting police activities, and a 
well entrenched belief that loyalty is far more 
essential than integrity for a street police 
officer can, unfortunately become established 
core cultural agency values, internalized by 
officers but rarely if ever discussed or reviewed. 
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If officers are not reviewing their respective 
values through competent training and frank 
discussion of the emotional demands of the job, 
"Core" ethics give way to "Situational Ethics". 
Officers not provided ongoing values training can 
naively perform a comparative assessment of 
their held core values and beliefs in relation to 
the social disorder that can typify their call-
loads. This potential transfer to "Situational 
Ethics" away from "Core Values" occurs in an 
emotionally charged atmosphere of perceived 
exigency of the situations in which the officer 
works. A sense of entitlement combines with a 
belief that the degree of the social deterioration 
permits situational suspension of core values for 
the police officer. "You won't exist for five 
minutes out here in this jungle with your core 
values", "these folks down here would eat you 
alive, all they understand is force", or "These 
folks respect what they fear, not your core 
values", can become the expression of the 
rationalization of values deterioration. 
 
This movement to situational values from core 
values many times put the police in direct 
confrontation with subgroups within society. 
Subgroups within our society that experience 
significant disenfranchisement in terms of 
education, employment and housing are 
particularly at risk for exposure to the 
"Situationally Ethical" police officer. Permitting 
the belief that separate standards of policing 
behavior are demanded in certain areas of the 
community has potentially tragic consequences 
for all involved. Although obviously more violent 
areas of any community require enhanced officer 
safety procedures tactically, they do not warrant 
suspension of ethical police behavior. 
 
The capacity to maintain ethical behavior can 
poise an overwhelming challenge to the young 
officer experiencing for the first time, 
challenges and questioning of his/her core values 
in a confrontational atmosphere supported only by 
other officers requiring camaraderie for survival. 
The more confrontational the situation, the more 
officers are required to rely on fellow officers 
for survival. Loyalty becomes more important than 
integrity. Officers policing in the more 
confrontational areas of any community require 
larger organizational resources invested in the 
area of values maintenance and review, however 
manpower shortage-, and high call-loads typically 
permit the administrator to perceive it as a low 
operational priority. This belief typically changes 
radically when an agency must react to a 
significant crisis stemming directly from 
inappropriate officer behavior patterns. 
 
To establish a values-based police agency requires 
the agency to invest resources into permitting 
officers to review the dynamic process of values 
formation and deterioration. Lectures from 
Internal Affairs on past investigations of "Bad 
Cops" that do not explain the underlying 
behavioral issues facing the officers only further 
alienates officers from the mechanisms of values 
based accountability. This potentially leads to the 
belief "so-called ‘values’ are externally imposed 
upon us by people who have either forgotten what 
the streets are really like or have never been out 
here". Officers without an understanding of the 
dynamic nature of values formation respond to 
values or ethics training with rather naive 
comments like "you can't teach ethics, either you 
have it or you don't". Vilifying officers that have 
produced major ethical or criminal transgressions 
does little to preserve core values if the officers 
do not gain insight into the dynamic process of 
ethical deterioration that leads to the violations. 
Strictly seeing the "Bad Cops" as some alien 
entity from other larger departments and 
unrelated to the "Good Cops" does nothing to 
inoculate officers to values/ethical deterioration. 
Interventions that pen-nit officers to realize 
that many times the compromised officer started 
his/her career as an enthusiastic values-based 
individual, who possibly only after 10 or more 
years of good service began the transgressions, 
permits a more valuable values/ethics review. 
Helping officers to understand their perception 
of values and ethics in policing as a potentially 
changeable state consisting of daily challenges 
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pen-nits officers to reduce their own respective 
naiveté and resistance to the issue. This also 
permits officers to develop and embrace 
strategies for ethical preservation and 
maintenance. Officers with well developed 
support systems and priorities consistent with 
their core values are more resistant to 
deterioration. Integrity inoculation and strategies 
for ethical maintenance requires effort and 
resources. These resources, however, are 
minuscule compared to what an agency invests 
dealing with a major ethical/values violation that 
destroys the public trust. Strategies to preserve 
values based behavior are varied. Group 
instruction/discussion of ethical issues by 
competent facilitators is fundamental. 
Information on past cases of corruption and the 
specific potential pitfalls to officers in any given 
jurisdiction is also essential. Officers with well 
developed support systems and balance in the 
realm of their personal lives can be expected to 
be perceptive of the full range consequences of 
their behavior. "Emotional Survival" training 
needs to be perceived as essential to the officer 
as street survival instruction. Officers need to 
learn the skills to develop and internalize a 
sophisticated sense of self accountability that 
stretches beyond the belief "us cops are 
victimized by having to deal with society's 
problems therefore we're justified or ‘Entitled’ 
to take liberties with rules or laws". Using 
exposure to hazard and risk in the line of duty as 
an officer as a means of rationalizing rule 
violations needs to be seen as a precursor to 
deterioration/corruption, not misplaced loyalty or 
camaraderie to fellow officers. "If it weren't for 
us where would society be?" at one level can be an 
expression of job commitment; at another level 
can be an expression of victimization and 
entitlement. A rationalization or belief that can 
prove disastrous to maintaining "Core" values-
based police officers. 
 
Providing law enforcement professionals with the 
information and support to remain core values-
based individuals should be a primary goal of any 
police administrator. Officers who maintain 
emotional and social perspective are the only ones 
who can professionally enforce societies values 
and norms. Officers who perceive themselves "at 
war" with the communities they serve, soon 
question their own internal values beliefs. 
Officers, due to special assignment, that are 
exposed to either increased risk or behavioral 
latitude are particularly vulnerable in this area. 
Although this questioning of values is to be 
expected it cannot be ignored. Competent 
intervention is demanded. Those officers who 
posses the belief "that due to everything we deal 
with and are exposed to on a daily basis we're 
‘Entitled’ to our own standard" spell a disaster to 
the community and agency alike. 
 
Editor’s note: “In Service: 10-8” would like to 
thank Dr. Kevin Gilmartin of Gilmartin, Harris, and 
Associates for permission in reprinting this 
article. This and many other excellent articles are 
available at the website of 
www.gilmartinharris.com. Dr. Gilmartin will be a 
keynote speaker at the Police Leadership 2004 
Conference. 
 
STANDARD FOR POLICE 
PURSUIT IS REASONABLENESS, 
NOT PERFECTION 
Cheung v. MacDonald et al, 2003 BCSC 689 
 
The standard required of police 
officers involved in a pursuit is 
not perfection, but rather 
whether they act reasonably 
according to the circumstances and within the 
powers imposed on them, the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia has ruled. In this case, the police 
pursued the drug-impaired driver of a highway 
maintenance truck after he stole the vehicle in 
Vancouver. The two large, roof top flashing 
orange lights and the large indicator arrow in the 
back of the truck remained on and flashing. The 
stolen vehicle was initially spotted by Vancouver 
police officers, driving an unmarked police car, 
enter onto Highway 1 eastbound. These officers 
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followed the vehicle at a distance of about 1 km 
while they awaited the arrival of the RCMP. A 
member of the Port Mann Freeway patrol picked 
up the vehicle on the highway and activated his 
emergency lights and siren. The roads were dry, 
it was daylight, but cloudy, and visibility was good. 
Traffic on the west side of the Port Mann bridge 
was described as heavy to moderate, but light on 
the east side. The pursuing officer requested a 
stop stick tire deflation device be deployed.    
 
A second RCMP unit joined in the pursuit and 
passed the suspect in an unsuccessful attempt to 
box him in. This officer then pulled back and 
became the secondary unit. As the pursuit 
continued, the suspect drove “in a fairly safe 
manner, changing lanes from time to time and 
driving no more than 10 to 20 kilometres over the 
posted speed limit.” Other motorists, seeing the 
flashing lights, would move over to allow the 
vehicles to pass. A police corporal took charge of 
the pursuit over the radio, but never called it off. 
 
Another RCMP officer, ahead of the chase, 
parked her vehicle diagonally across the slow lane 
of the highway, diverting traffic into the fast 
lane. Armed with two connected stop sticks, she 
then stood about 15 feet in front of her vehicle 
ready to toss them. As the suspect approached, 
he made an abrupt turn from the right hand 
shoulder across the slow lane into the fast lane. 
The officer then deployed the stop stick. 
Unfortunately, there was another motorist in the 
fast lane and the stop sticks were deployed in 
front of this vehicle, which ran over them. The 
suspect driver then crashed into the rear of the 
motorist, pushing him 150 feet down the highway. 
In total, the pursuit lasted for almost 20 minutes. 
 
The motorist, Dr. Cheung, sued the suspect and 
the police for his injuries arising from the 
accident. In his claim, he argued that the police 
were negligent by pursuing the suspect and for 
blocking traffic at a time and in a manner that 
was dangerous to other motorists. He submitted 
that the police pursuit policy was meant to 
“remove the thinking” of the officers. However, 
on this point Justice Loo of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court disagreed: 
 
In my view, the policies are intended to assist 
the thinking.  A police officer who is involved in 
a pursuit and not thinking is not coming 
anywhere close to meeting the requisite 
standard of care.  The policies are a guideline to 
assist in assessing whether to start, continue, 
or terminate a pursuit.  Police involved in a 
pursuit must be constantly thinking and 
constantly assessing the situation in an effort 
to balance the need to apprehend a suspect and 
any unnecessary risk to public safety. 
 
Cheung also proposed that the pursuit should not 
have been initiated for a simple theft of 
automobile because the police pursuit policy 
prohibited chases for minor violations. Ruling that 
the theft and possession of stolen vehicle is not a 
minor violation, Justice Loo noted that the 
pursuit policy was a guideline and did not have the 
force of law. In her view, it was open to the 
officer to initiate the pursuit. She also found 
that he considered the factors outlined in the 
guideline in deciding whether to continue with or 
terminate the pursuit. Furthermore, while the 
pursuit lasted for almost 20 minutes, the 
conditions for continuing the pursuit were close 
to optimal.   
 
The plaintiff’s suggestion that that the pursuit 
was not supervised properly was also rejected. 
Justice Loo stated: 
 
I also cannot find fault with the manner in 
which the pursuit was supervised.  As the only 
officer on duty from his detachment at the 
time, it was necessary for [the officer] to act 
as his own supervisor at the outset of the 
pursuit.  [The corporal] assumed control as 
soon as he arrived at the detachment and 
came on duty, as required by the policy.  [The 
corporal] could have called off the pursuit, but 
he did not.  Neither he nor [the officer] can 
be criticized. [para. 42] 
 
Cheung further argued that use of the police 
vehicle to block the lane was not a control device, 
but rather a hazard. He contended that the 
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suspect driver should not have been forced to 
make a choice to go to the left, right, or through 
the police vehicle and that he should have been 
permitted to continue until he decided to stop. 
Justice Loo disagreed. The placement of the 
police vehicle in the slow lane “forces traffic to a 
smaller target area and increases the chances of 
throwing the stop stick or other spike belt in 
front of the target vehicle”, said the judge. The 
suspect had two full tanks of gas and had no 
intention of stopping. No liability arose from the 
blocking of the lane or from the tossing of the 
stop stick. The accident would have occurred even 
if the stop stick was not thrown in front of 
Cheung’s vehicle. The suspect was fully 
responsible for the accident. He was not paying 
attention and abruptly changed lanes before the 
collision. The claim against the police was 
dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
COMMISSION RULES OFFICER 
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST 
VEHICLE OCCUPANT 
Johnson v. Halifax Police Service et al., 
Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission 
(December 22, 2003) 
 
A police officer stopped a Texas 
registered vehicle owned and 
occupied by Johnson, a well 
known black Nova Scotia 
heavyweight boxer, after 
following it along a highway. Johnson was a 
passenger while his friend, who was also black, 
was the driver. The officer asked for the vehicle 
documents (which were valid under Texas law), 
but was not satisfied with the information 
provided, partly in response to an erroneous 
interpretation of a NCIC computer report. The 
driver was ticketed and the vehicle was towed. 
The following day the seizure was determined to 
be a mistake and the car was released. A Nova 
Scotia Police Act complaint filed by Johnson 
alleging abuse of authority was written off as an 
error in judgment. He then filed a complaint 
under Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act alleging he 
was discriminated against because of his race and 
colour.  
 
The Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission Board 
of Inquiry, adjudicated by Philip Girard, first 
examined the law regarding such complaints. In 
this case, Johnson would have to establish a prima 
facie case, on a balance of probabilities, that he 
was discriminated against (adversely treated) at 
least in part because of his race. The burden 
would then shift to the police to “demonstrate a 
rational and credible justification for their 
conduct”, at which point Johnson would then have 
to show the justifications put forth by the police 
were merely pretexts or veils for the 
discriminatory conduct.  
 
The Stop 
 
The Commission found that the officer did not 
know the race of the vehicle’s occupants when he 
initially decided to follow it. However, when he 
decided to pass the vehicle, the officer observed 
the occupants colour. Of course, this by itself 
does not prove discrimination unless it can be 
demonstrated that their race caused them to be 
treated differently from other citizens. In this 
case, the officer’s unusual conduct in following 
the vehicle as he did, along with his denials of 
such, was held to be discriminatory.  
 
In Girard’s view, once the officer discerned the 
race of the vehicle’s occupants, his decision to 
stop them was based on a stereotype of black 
criminality. Even though there were other 
legitimate factors to the stop, such as the fact 
the vehicle appeared to be eluding the officer 
and his interpretation of the NCIC report, the 
awareness of race, either at a conscious or 
subconscious level, was an operative element in his 
decision making and thus a violation of the Human 
Rights Act.  
 
As Girard noted, he believed the officer was 
much less likely to continue following the vehicle 
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had there been two well dressed white men in the 
car. Finding the officer less than candid on some 
key points, Girard found the officer unable to 
rebut the prima facie case for discrimination. 
 
Ticketing and Towing 
 
The issuing of the tickets to the driver and the 
decision to tow the vehicle was also held to be 
discriminatory in that these actions were 
motivated by race and would not have resulted 
with a white driver. The officer was not satisfied 
with the documentation provided by the driver. 
The vehicle was out of province registered and 
the police cannot be expected to memorize the 
documentation requirements of all North 
American jurisdictions. However, if the officer is 
not familiar with the form of documentation 
produced, they will have to speak to the driver to 
ascertain the requirements of the unfamiliar 
jurisdiction. No such action was taken in this case.  
 
The officer was not courteous to Johnson nor did 
he make any inquiries into what the legal 
requirements were in Texas nor properly assess 
the documentation offered. This was 
unprofessional police behaviour, deviated from 
normal practice, and was evidence of discourtesy 
or intransigence, which provided grounds for 
finding differential treatment based principally 
on race. Although the initial suspicion about the 
documentation was reasonable, the officer did 
not provide a fair chance for Johnson, as the 
registered owner of the vehicle, to respond which 
resulted from the officer’s use of racial 
stereotyping.  
 
The Halifax Regional Police was also found to be 
vicariously liable, in that the sergeant attending 
the scene failed to intervene in a possible 
discriminatory act in progress. Johnson showed 
the sergeant an insurance letter, which 
demonstrated that the officer was possibly in 
error. This, along with the race of the occupants, 
was indicative of discrimination and the sergeant 
should have investigated further to ensure no 
discriminatory act was taking place. As Girard 
stated, “[the sergeant] could have provided the 
sober second look that was sorely needed, but did 
not.”  
 
Level of Police Response 
 
Johnson’s allegation that the police response was 
excessive and discriminatory was rejected. He 
submitted that there were more police officers 
and vehicles (5 cars and a police wagon) on the 
scene of this traffic stop resulting in an over-
response and not objectively justified. It was his 
position that the level of response was more 
appropriate for a criminal investigation, rather 
than a motor vehicle offence. Although the police 
response to the traffic stop was “unusually 
strong” and there was little objective 
justification for more than three police cars, it 
was not related to the race of the occupants and 
did not result from any discriminatory behaviour. 
Rather, it was “simply opportunity to check out an 
unusually long traffic stop on a slow night” the 
Commission stated.  
 
Recommendations 
 
As a result of the Commission’s findings, the 
following recommendations, advisements, urgings, 
awards, orders, suggestions, and requests were 
made: 
 
• It was recommended that the Halifax 
Regional Police Service obtain a legal opinion 
about the statutory and constitutional 
authority of Nova Scotia police officers to 
routinely request proof of registration and 
insurance from out-of-province vehicles and 
to seek legislative amendments if necessary. 
In the Commission’s opinion, police officers do 
not have the legal authority under Nova 
Scotia’s Motor Vehicle Act to ask for such 
documents, except perhaps under common law 
authority if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe a vehicle is stolen. 
 
• It was advised that problems resulting from 
police over-response (escalating the situation 
and negative public perception) be 
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incorporated into traffic stop training. 
Further, police officers and dispatchers 
should be made aware that excessive police 
response might be considered discriminatory 
depending on the circumstances. 
 
• It was urged that a senior member of the 
police administration take a personal tour of 
the NCIC facility in West Virginia to learn 
exactly what the centre does and to re-
educate all police officers and dispatchers 
about the nature of NCIC reports. The 
officer in this case misunderstood the NCIC 
report, which resulted from his training. 
There was confusion about what information 
NCIC collects and what inferences can and 
cannot be drawn from its reports. 
 
• Johnson was awarded $4,920 in special 
damages for six trips he would not have 
otherwise made to the Halifax area in 
connection with this case and $10,000 (plus 
2.5% interest from the date of the stop) in 
general damages. Exemplary damages were 
not warranted.  
 
• The driver of the car was awarded $1,000, 
even though he was not a complainant in this 
proceeding, because he experienced the 
effects of this discriminatory act. 
 
• It was suggested that an outreach effort by 
the Halifax Regional Police Service be made 
with the surrounding black communities of 
North Preston, East Preston, or Cherry Brook, 
even though they are policed by the RCMP.  
 
• It was ordered that a needs assessment for 
diversity training be undertaken by two 
consulting groups, one local and one from 
outside the Maritimes. Once the report is 
completed , the Halifax Regional Police must 
make a public response and indicate what 
steps it is planning on taking in light of the 
report. 
 
• It was requested that lawyers for the Halifax 
Police submit one or more proposals on how 
information could be provided on the role of 
race in traffic stops.  
 
• It was suggested that the Halifax Police 
engage an outside consultant with expertise in 
restorative justice theory and methods to re-
design their police complaints process. 
 
• It was suggested that the parties involved in 
this proceeding think about whether they are 
willing to offer forgiveness and a sincere 
apology, perhaps through a skilled mediator or 
facilitator paid for by the Halifax Regional 
Police, in order to close the circle on this 
matter.  
 
Complete case available at www.gov.ns.ca/humanrights 
 
PATROLS ON THE WILD SIDE:  
WHERE FACTS ARE OFTEN 
FUNNIER THAN FICTION 
collected by Constable Ian Barraclough 
 
Innovative Ticket Dispute Down Under 
Quadruples Fine 
 
Mad Aussie Carlos DeMarco 
got cheesed off by two 
speeding tickets emanating 
from the same police camera 
posted in a 60km/hour zone 
in November last year. The 39 year old driver 
went to the trouble of stealing a 70km/hour sign, 
which he then affixed to the pole beneath the 
very speed camera against which he had already 
been ticketed. He then photographed the sign as 
evidence, which he later produced in Parramatta 
Local Court in Sydney to prove that he was 
innocent. His plan was foiled however because he 
was spotted taking the photos in broad daylight 
by a passer-by who watched him hatch his 
harebrained scheme and alerted authorities. 
 
By the time the court was finished with DeMarco, 
he was ordered to pay $900 in fines and 
expenses, about $700 more than the two tickets 
would have cost him originally. "I have found you 
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to be a liar," Magistrate Lee Gilmour said in 
punishing DeMarco. (Edited and excerpted from 
an article in the Sydney Daily Telegraph and 
United Press International). 
 
Caught Red Handed & Red Faced with 
Pants Down  
 
So you catch a man driving 
with his pants around his 
ankles. On further 
observation, you notice 
that he’s paying more 
attention to the display on his laptop balanced 
precariously upon his naked legs than the road 
he’s driving along. Suddenly, he turns down a one-
way street. He’s now going in the wrong direction. 
It’s 5am on a winters’ morning. As you stop the 
vehicle to investigate the matter, your find his 
computer streaming kiddie porn from the wireless 
internet. What do you charge him with? 
 
That was the dilemma faced by Toronto traffic 
police when they stopped 33-year old Walter 
Nowakowski who was followed for several blocks 
and then stopped when he was observed driving 
the wrong way down a residential one-way street. 
The police report states that the Toronto officer 
found Nowakowski not wearing pants and driving 
around while watching a pornographic movie on his 
laptop involving a 10-year old girl. 
 
Nowakowski was allegedly watching the 
pornographic images as they were being streamed 
live using a hijacked wireless Internet connection. 
Following his arrest, police searched 
Nowakowski's home where they recovered 10 
computers along with thousands of CDs and floppy 
disks suspected to contain child porn images.  
 
Nowakowski, who appeared in court on December 
23rd, faced numerous charges, including 
possession of child pornography and theft of 
communications. What, no driving offences? 
(Edited and excerpted from an article in The 
Register and The London Free Press.) 
 
 
From US Police Blotters  
 
(1) James Perry, with four drunk driving arrests 
in Florida, feared rejection if he tried to get 
a driver's license in his new home state of 
Connecticut and so pretended to be Robert 
Kowalski, the name of his neighbour in Florida. 
However, this led to a police computer check, 
which revealed that "Robert Kowalski" was on 
file as a Michigan sex offender. (Chillicothe 
News, Ohio). 
 
(2) 44-year old Toni Lycan became so carried 
away during a shouting war with a downstairs 
neighbour over loud music, that she stomped 
up and down on the floor until she broke both 
her legs about four inches below the knee 
(Vancouver Washington News). 
 
(3) Chance Copp, 15, who was on probation for 
arson and who feared testing positive for 
marijuana, submitted urine of a relative 
instead, only to find out later from police that 
the urine had tested positive for cocaine 
(Columbus Dispatch-AP).  
 
(4) According to the arresting officer, 20-year 
old Devikia Garnett was calm when he stopped 
her for speeding in Virginia in November. 
However, after accepting the ticket, she 
quickly developed second thoughts against the 
officer, slamming her car into the back of his 
cruiser, then stopping and accelerating again, 
smashing his car in a similar fashion three 
more times. After the police officer avoided 
her fifth pass, Garnett spun around and 
headed straight for him, but he managed to 
pin her in before being struck again. 
(Associated Press). 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
The achievements of an organization are the 
results of the combined efforts of each 
individual—Vince Lombardi 
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2004 POLICE ACADEMY 
COURSES 
 
The JIBC Police Academy 
has recently released its 
2004 Course Calendar. 
There are a number of 
Advanced Police Training 
courses designed to provide police officers with 
professional development in operational, 
investigative, administrative, and communications 
topics, including supervisory and management 
training.  Subject to specific criteria, attendance 
is generally restricted to sworn police officers 
who have been selected by their Training Officer; 
registration will not be accepted from individual 
members. A complete and updated copy of the 
course calendar along with detailed course 
descriptions is available online at www.jibc.bc.ca.  
 
March 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV646 Tactical Surveillance** 1-5 
POLADV645 Search & Seizure** 8-11 
POLADV687 School Liaison Officer 15-19 
POLADV677 Police Supervisors 22-26 
POLADV602 BAC Datamaster C 29-2 
 
April 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV690 Selection & Interviewing 5-6 
POLADV629 Forensic Interviewing 19-23 
POLFTS140 IDD & SFST** 19-22 
POLADV637 Undercover Operator 18-30 
POLADV646 Tactical Surveillance 26-30 
 
May 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV645 Search & Seizure 3-6 
POLFTS140 IDD & SFST 3-6 
POLADV664 Interviewing/Mentoring 10-12 
POLADV640 General Invest. Skills** 17-21 
POLADV627 Forensic DNA 17-21 
 
 
June 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV657 Effective Presentations** 7-11 
POLFTS100 Basic Collision Invest. 7-16 
POLADV646 Tactical Surveillance 14-18 
POLADV630 Forensic Interviewing 14-18 
POLADV672 Media Relations 14-18 
 
September 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV633 Forensic mapping 7-17 
POLADV677 Police Supervisors** 13-17 
POLADV640 General Invest. Skills 13-17 
POLADV652 Admin Skills** 20-24 
 
October 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV690 Selection & Interviewing 4-5 
POLADV602 BAC Datamaster C 4-8 
POLADV657 Effective Presentations 18-22 
POLADV677 Police Supervisors 18-22 
POLADV661 Field Trainers TBA 
POLFTS140 IDD & SFST 25-28 
 
November 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV628 Crime Scene Diagrams 1-5 
POLADV635 Criminal Intelligence** 8-10 
POLADV656 Effective Writing 8-9 
POLADV646 Tactical Surveillance II 15-19 
POLADV640 General Invest. Skills 15-19 
POLADV652 Admin Skills 22-26 
POLADV691 Pedestrian Collision 29-6 
 
December 
Code Course Name Dates 
POLADV631 Effective Presentations 6-10 
POLADV642 IDD & SFST Instructors 6-10 
POLADV622 Drug Investigators 6-17 
POLADV645 Search & Seizure 13-16 
 
**courses will be held on Vancouver Island. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Only in a police state is the job of a policeman 
easy—Orson Welles 
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RESIDENTIAL ‘FLIR’ NOT A 
SEARCH 
R. v. Rugg, 2003 BCPC 444 
 
The police received an 
anonymous tip of a marihuana 
grow operation and conducted 
some follow-up investigation, 
which included the use of a Forward Looking 
Infra Red (FLIR) device to obtain a heat 
signature from the accused’s residence consistent 
with a marihuana cultivation.  As a result of their 
investigation, the police applied for and were 
granted a search warrant. During a voir dire in 
British Columbia Provincial Court, Justice 
Higinbotham concluded that the use of FLIR did 
not constitute a search. A police officer 
demonstrated for the judge how the FLIR works 
in picking up a “heat picture” of an object. In the 
judge’s view, “it does not penetrate, or see into or 
behind any surface” nor did it provide any core 
biological information about the residents of the 
home. Justice Higinbotham stated: 
 
In fact, [the FLIR] reveals less of the 
lifestyle of the occupant than do the records 
of electrical consumption, and far less than 
does public, passive, physical observation of a 
suspect as he or she goes about daily life, both 
of which are constitutionally approved.  
 
Although some previous cases, like the Ontario 
Court of Appeal decision R. v. Tessling (now under 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada), have 
come to a contrary conclusion, the judge noted 
they did not have the benefit of a FLIR 
demonstration in the courtroom. In addressing 
the Tessling judgment’s requirement that a 
warrant is necessary to use FLIR, he held: 
 
In Tessling, [Justice Abella] states that a 
search warrant would be necessary in order to 
legitimize the use of FLIR technology on a 
residence. I question why an investigator would 
apply for a FLIR authorization when it would 
require the same justification as an application 
to actually enter the residence and paw 
through the bedroom drawers? In the case at 
bar, the police felt they needed the FLIR 
results to justify a search warrant, and this 
would likely be true in most cases where a 
FLIR examination was conducted. It is clear 
that if the police had enough grounds for a 
"FLIR warrant", they wouldn't need one, 
because they would already have sufficient 
grounds to enter the property. 
 
The FLIR was not a search for the purposes of 
s.8 of the Charter and it could legitimately be 
used to support a search warrant. However, the 
warrant was invalid because a justice of the peace 
who did not have the necessary judicial 
independence issued it. In examining the 
admissibility of the evidence under s.24(2), the 
evidence was excluded. The justice found that 
the information to obtain only provided a 
reasonable possibility, not the required 
reasonable probability (reasonable grounds). 
Although the FLIR results were consistent with a 
grow operation, the police officer testified “he 
would under no circumstances conclude, on any 
legal standard, that a marihuana cultivation was 
taking place within the residence.” 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
‘DETECTIVE INSPECTOR’ 
NEITHER DEMOTED NOR 
DISMISSED 
Rossmo v. Vancouver Police Board et al, 
2003 BCCA 677 
 
The plaintiff, who held a PhD in 
Criminology, was a constable with 
the Vancouver Police Department 
given the position of “detective 
inspector” in charge of the 
department’s Geographic Profiling Unit for a 
fixed 5-year term. He was not promoted to the 
rank of inspector. Rather, the title he was given 
was outside the rank structure of the department 
and was created especially for his role while in 
charge of the experimental unit. He was, however, 
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paid the same compensation as an Inspector and 
signed an agreement.  
 
At the end of the 5-year agreement, a further 2 
year deal was offered, but rejected by the 
plaintiff because it was not what he was looking 
for. The contract was not renewed and the 
plaintiff was offered re-employment as a 
constable.  The plaintiff considered this a 
demotion. 
 
The plaintiff sued the Vancouver Police Board for 
wrongful dismissal and a Deputy Chief for 
interference with contractual relations and 
inducing breach of contract (not to renew the 
agreement).  At trial in British Columbia Supreme 
Court, the judge found that the plaintiff had 
neither been demoted nor dismissed, but rather 
the agreement expired. The plaintiff rejected 
the 2-year contract extension and the Police 
Board had no obligation to place him in an 
Inspector position. The plaintiff then appealed to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal.  
 
Justice Donald, writing for the unanimous court, 
dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff had 
signed a contract for a 5-year term, which was 
not renewed. The plaintiff was not “promoted” to 
the rank of inspector, therefore the offer to 
restore him bank to the rank of constable was not 
a demotion. The trial judge made no error in 
concluding that the contract of the position of 
“Detective Inspector” simply ended.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
WITHOUT ARTICULABLE 
CAUSE, SAFETY SEARCH NOT 
JUSTIFIED 
R. v. Nielsen, 2003 ABPC 56 
 
Two Calgary police officers were 
patrolling near a hotel bar 
parking lot, known as a high drug 
trafficking area, when they 
observed three people approach 
a parked van with BC licence plates. The driver 
exited the vehicle and entered the hotel while 
the accused exited from the passenger side. One 
officer dealt with the driver while another 
officer decided to check the accused and inquired 
into what he was doing. The accused relied that 
he was doing nothing. 
 
The officer noted the accused appeared 
intoxicated and was fidgeting with his pant’s 
pocket. The officer asked what was in the 
accused’s pants for reasons of officer safety 
because it was his experience that it was not 
uncommon for people under detention or arrest to 
be in possession of weapons. The accused 
removed a crack pipe with heavy cocaine residue 
and was arrested for public intoxication under 
Alberta’s Gaming and Liquor Act and possession of 
a crack pipe. A search was conducted and two 
rocks of crack cocaine were found. He was then 
arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance.  
 
During a voir dire, the accused testified that he 
met the driver of the van and went with him to 
consume marihuana in the van. He was handed the 
pipe, which he though was marihuana, just as the 
police car arrived. He said the driver jumped out 
of the van and went back to the bar while he 
exited the passenger’s side. He also testified 
that he removed the pipe from his pocket 
because the officer told him to.  
 
At his trial in Alberta Provincial, Court Justice 
Lamoureux found that police had detained the 
accused after he exited the van and was stopped 
and questioned because of his presence in an area 
known as a haven for drug trafficking. However, 
the police did not have any authority to detain 
the accused and the detention was arbitrary 
because there was no articulable cause. Justice 
Lamoureux stated: 
 
In this case, police officers…were not 
investigating any alleged crime. They were 
simply on a routine patrol near the Cecil Hotel 
in an area in which they believed to be an area 
for “ drug trafficking”. It is the Court’s view, 
that police opinion about locations of crime in a 
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city, is not per se a reasonable foundation of 
articulable cause for detention. The Court has 
not heard any evidence in the voir dire of “ a 
constellation of objectively discernable facts” 
which provided either police officer with 
reasonable cause to suspect that the accused 
had committed an offence. The accused was 
not a driver of a motor vehicle involved in a 
traffic stop. He was not in the course of 
committing any criminal offence. At worst, the 
accused might have been an intoxicated 
passenger in a stationary motor vehicle. [para. 
26] 
 
And further: 
 
The Court recognizes that the police duty to 
prevent crime and maintain the public peace 
does require proactive measures on their part. 
Proactive policing does interfere from time to 
time with individual liberty. It is somewhat 
easier to justify such interference when the 
interference relates to qualified rights such 
as the right to drive. If there is proactive 
policing amounting to an interference of 
individual rights unrelated to qualified rights 
such as driving, then the interference is more 
difficult to justify. 
 
In this case, the Crown appears to be 
suggesting that there was an apprehended 
breach of the peace by the accused. With 
respect, I disagree. In this case, the only act 
that caused the police to detain the accused, 
was his exit from the passenger side of a 
parked van in the Cecil Hotel parking lot, an 
area which the police viewed to be a haven for 
drug trafficking. 
 
It is the Court’s conclusion that the police did 
not have authority, either in common law or 
statutory power, to detain the accused. The 
accused’s detention was arbitrary in that 
there was no objectively discernable set of 
facts justifying his questioning by police. The 
mere fact that the accused was found in an 
area which the police viewed to be a high 
trafficking area for drugs is insufficient to 
support a detention in either a common law or 
by statute in the absence of evidence 
establishing the truth of this opinion. 
 
Accordingly, I find that the accused was 
detained by the officer in order to allow them 
to follow ‘ a hunch’ about the accused’s 
conduct. There was no offence which had been 
or was reasonably suspected to be committed 
in the future. The detention of this accused 
was arbitrary. [paras. 30-33] 
 
As for the search of the accused’s pant pocket 
that preceded the arrest, Justice Lamoureux 
found the search violated the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights: 
 
The Court must also review whether the police 
officers, in this case, can lawfully search the 
accused for the purpose of officer safety. 
There is no question that during investigative 
detention based on articulable cause, that the 
police have power to effect a search for the 
purpose of officer safety, without warrant… 
 
However, the authority of an officer to effect 
a search of an accused without warrant for 
purposes of officer safety, can only be 
sustained if the original investigative 
detention is based on articulable cause…There 
can be no proper search of an accused for 
purposes of officer safety during investigative 
detention unless articulable cause…exists. In 
this case, I have already concluded that the 
detention of the accused was arbitrary and 
without articulable cause. Accordingly, the 
police officers cannot justify the search of 
the accused for officer safety purposes. 
[para. 40-41, references omitted] 
 
The evidence was excluded. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Things in law tend to be black and white. But we 
all know that some people are a little bit guilty, 
while other people are guilty as hell—Donald R. 
Cressey 
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CLASS 94 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 94 as qualified 
municipal constables on January 23, 
2004. 
 
 
 
ABBOTSFORD 
Cst. Jerry Holz 
Cst. Jeffrey Morgan 
Cst. Angela Scott 
 
 
DELTA  
Cst. Leisa Bernard 
Cst. Deanna Church 
 
 
NEW WESTMINSTER 
Cst. Colin Betts 
 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Julia Agosti 
Cst. Corey Bech 
Cst. Ian Christie 
Cst. Michelle Farrell 
Cst. Ryan Hooper 
Cst. Jennifer Jackman 
Cst. Chad Machuik 
Cst. Donald MacIver 
Cst. Robert Mitchelson 
Cst. Colin Naismith 
Cst. Aaron Olson 
Cst. Kristina Paech 
Cst. Jason Perry 
Cst. Andrew Prebushewski 
Cst. Jason Ruzycki 
Cst. Sukhjit Sangha 
Cst. Caroline Wigglesworth 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Jennifer 
Jackman (Vancouver), who was the 
recipient of the British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of Police 
Shield of Merit for best all around 
recruit performance in basic training. Cst. Jerry 
Holz (Abbotsford) received the Abbotsford Police 
Association Oliver Thomson Trophy for 
outstanding physical fitness. Cst. Jennifer 
Jackman (Vancouver) received the Vancouver 
Police Union Excellence in Academics award for 
best academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. 
Caroline Wigglesworth (Vancouver) received the 
British Columbia Federation of Police Officers 
Valedictorian award for being selected by her 
peers to represent her class at the graduation 
ceremony. Cst. Aaron Olson (Vancouver) was the 
recipient of the Abbotsford Police Recruit 
Marksmanship award for highest qualification 
score during Block 3 training. Port Moody Police 
Chief Paul Shrive was the keynote speaker at the 
ceremony. 
DEFICIENT SOBRIETY TESTS 
DO NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE 
GROUNDS 
R. v. McNabb, 2003 BCPC 180 
 
At 1:40 am a police officer 
responded to a civilian’s tip of a 
possible impaired driver. He 
located the suspect vehicle 
stopped at a traffic light without headlights that 
seemed to be lurching forward. The officer 
followed the vehicle for less than five minutes 
and saw the vehicle weaving in its lane. He 
stopped the accused and noted she spoke slowly. 
She denied drinking but the officer smelled liquor 
in the cab of the pickup. Since there was a 
passenger in the vehicle, the officer asked the 
accused to step outside so he could isolate the 
source of the liquor odour. She initially stumbled, 
and walked unsteadily to the back of her pick-up. 
The officer smelled liquor about the accused, her 
eyes were slightly bloodshot and her face was 
lightly flushed. Even though the officer had not 
yet received any training in standardized field 
sobriety tests, he nonetheless conducted three 
sobriety tests; the leg raise, the alphabet 
recitation, and picking up coins. One test was 
satisfactorily performed and two were not. The 
officer formed the opinion the accused was 
impaired and a breath demand was made. Two 
samples of breath were subsequently obtained.  
 
At her trial in British Columbia Provincial Court on 
charges of impaired driving and over 80mg%, the 
accused argued the breath samples were 
inadmissible because the police officer did not 
have the requisite reasonable and probable 
grounds upon which to justify the demand. As 
such, she submitted that the taking of the 
samples therefore amounted to an unreasonable 
search and seizure under s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Reasonable and probable grounds for the taking 
of breath samples “involves both a subjective and 
an objective component.“ Subjectively, the 
officer must have an actual or honest belief that 
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the suspect's ability to operate a motor vehicle 
was impaired. Objectively, the officer’s opinion 
must be supported by objective facts. In this 
case, the officer’s observations made prior to the 
sobriety tests, either singly or in combination, on 
his own testimony did not provide reasonable and 
probable grounds. Rather, the three sobriety 
tests were instrumental in raising the officer’s 
suspicion to reasonable and probable grounds for 
the breath demand. Justice Blake found “the 
sobriety tests alone… caused the officer’s 
suspicions to coalesce into [the fixed opinion that 
the accused was impaired by alcohol].”  
 
Roadside field sobriety tests can be used as 
evidence, but they will take on a “clinical or 
pseudo-scientific air.” If a trained expert can 
only interpret the tests used, a police officer 
must be properly trained in their administration 
and interpretation before they will be sufficient 
to provide objective reasonable and probable 
grounds. Furthermore, if the test is performed 
improperly the objective standard will not be 
satisfied.  
 
In this case, a recognized expert involving 
matters of alcohol consumption, its effects on 
the human body and behaviour, and field sobriety 
tests, provided evidence. He testified that the 
leg raise test varied significantly from standard 
procedure. The test was conducted on an uphill 
grade rather than a flat surface, the accused was 
asked to raise her leg twice as high as established 
standards, and she was required to spread her 
arms rather than keep them at her sides. As for 
the alphabet test, it is not a standardized test at 
all and would probable not be reliable from which 
to draw a conclusion. Finally, the officer did not 
place enough significance on the accused’s success 
in picking up the coins from the surface of the 
roadway, which is not a standardized test because 
it is too difficult to perform. In the expert’s 
opinion, satisfactory performance of this test 
should be taken as significant proof of an absence 
of impairment.    
 
In excluding the results of the breath tests, 
Justice Blake stated: 
 
The field sobriety tests adopted in this case 
were clearly deficient. One test deviated 
significantly from standardized practice. 
Another bore no resemblance to standardized 
testing. The tests themselves seem to have 
been designed by the police officer himself 
without regard to known and available 
standards, simply on the basis of his own 
unverified expectations about the physical 
abilities of others. With respect to the one 
test (perhaps the most difficult of all) which 
[the accused] performed to the officer's 
satisfaction, I am left completely in the dark 
as to how (or if) the officer factored the 
result into his conclusion. Indeed, the whole 
notion of "scoring" the tests in any way does 
not seem to have been considered by the 
officer. 
 
In the end result, I find that the field 
sobriety tests which were conducted, and the 
results which were obtained, were 
insufficiently probative of alcohol impairment 
to allow an objective, informed observer to 
conclude that there existed reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe in [the accused’s] 
impairment by alcohol once the tests had been 
completed. Or, to state my conclusion a little 
differently by taking into account the other 
observations made by the police officer in this 
case, I do not believe it can fairly be said that 
the field sobriety tests which were conducted 
and the results which were obtained could 
reasonably allow the police officer's existing 
suspicions to be transformed into a fixed 
opinion of impairment on [the accused’s] part. 
Whichever way it is stated, my ultimate 
conclusion is the same: The police officer's 
demand was not based on reasonable and 
probable grounds, objectively viewed, and [the 
accused’s] section 8 Charter rights were 
violated as a result. [paras. 32-33] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Without vision, the people perish—Proverbs 29:18 
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ON-DUTY DEATHS DOWN 
 
On-duty peace officer 
deaths in Canada are at 
their lowest in 10 years. 
In 2003, six peace 
officers lost their lives 
on the job. This equals 
the 10-year lows of 
1994, 1996, 1998, and 
1999 and represents a 46% reduction over 2002.  
 
Motor vehicles, not guns, pose the greatest risk 
to officers. Over the last 10 years, 37 officers 
have lost their lives in circumstances involving 
vehicles, including automobile and motorcycle 
accidents (27), vehicular assault (1), and being 
struck by a vehicle (9). These deaths account for 
49% of all on-duty deaths, which is more than 
three times the next leading causes of aircraft 
accidents and gunfire, each taking 11 lives from 
1994 to 2003. On average, 7.5 officers per year 
lost their lives during the last decade, while 1997 
and 2002 had the most deaths at 11 per year.  
 
 “They are our heroes.  
We shall not forget them.”3 
 
 
                                                 
3 Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings 
Ottawa, Ontario. 
2003 Roll of Honour 
 
Conservation Officer Walter Ceolin 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, ON 
End of Watch: January 21, 2003 
Cause of Death: Aircraft accident  
 
Senior Constable Philip R. Shrive 
Ontario Provincial Police, ON 
End of Watch: May 23, 2003 
Cause of Death: Automobile accident  
 
Constable Ghislain Maurice 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: June 10, 2003 
Cause of Death: Automobile accident  
 
Senior Constable John Paul Flagg 
Ontario Provincial Police, ON 
End of Watch: September 20, 2003 
Cause of Death: Motorcycle accident  
 
Corporal Stephen Gibson 
Canadian Forces Military Police, CAN 
End of Watch: September 26, 2003 
Cause of Death: Automobile accident  
 
Constable Patrick Levesque 
Surete Du Quebec, QC 
End of Watch: September 27, 2003 
Cause of Death: Aircraft accident 
Canadian Peace Officer On Duty Deaths (by year) 
Cause 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Total 
Aircraft accident 2  1 2 1  4  1  11 
Auto accident 3 5 2 1 1 2 2 2 4 2 24 
Drowned   1   1 1 1  2 6 
Fall    1       1 
Gunfire  1 2    3 2 2 1 11 
Heart attack  1  1  1 1    4 
Motorcycle accident 1   2       3 
Natural disaster  1         1 
Stabbed      1     1 
Struck by vehicle  3  2 2 1  1   9 
Training accident   1  1     1 3 
Vehicular assault     1      1 
Total 6 11 7 9 6 6 11 6 7 6 75 
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page www.odmp.org/canada [accessed January 12, 2004] 
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CLASS 95 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 95 as qualified 
municipal constables on January 23, 
2004. 
 
 
ABBOTSFORD 
Cst. Martin Walrod 
 
DELTA  
Cst. Bentley Johannson 
Cst. David Vaughan-Smith 
 
PORT MOODY 
Cst. Fraser Renard 
 
SAANICH 
Cst. David Gray 
Cst. Tara McNeil 
Cst. Roy Radu 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Oscar Alverez 
Cst. Ian Barraclough 
Cst. Terry Duesterwald 
Cst. Paul Dungey 
Cst. Linda Grange 
Cst. David Hopp 
Cst. Jordan Lennox 
Cst. Clifton Louie 
Cst. John Roberts 
Cst. Edward Scally 
Cst. Alvin Shum 
Cst. Mehrban Sidhu 
Cst. Steven Stefani 
Cst. Paul Sewek 
Cst. Michelle Trudel 
Cst. Michael Wagar 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Roy Radu 
(Saanich), who was the recipient of 
the British Columbia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for 
best all around recruit performance 
in basic training. Cst. Michael Wagar (Vancouver) 
received the Abbotsford Police Association Oliver 
Thomson Trophy for outstanding physical fitness. 
Cst. Paul Sewek (Vancouver) received the 
Vancouver Police Union Excellence in Academics 
award for best academic test results in all 
disciplines. Cst. Paul Dungey (Vancouver) received 
the British Columbia Federation of Police Officers 
Valedictorian award for being selected by his 
peers to represent his class at the graduation 
ceremony. Cst. Paul Sewek (Vancouver) was the 
recipient of the Abbotsford Police Recruit 
Marksmanship award for highest qualification 
score during Block 3 training. Port Moody Police 
Chief Paul Shrive was the keynote speaker at the 
ceremony. 
 
 
APPREHENSION BY POLICE DOG 
REASONABLE 
Robinow v. City of Vancouver et al,  
2003 BCSC 661 
 
Police were dispatched to a 
theft in progress at 1:39 am 
where they saw a van driving in 
the area. They assumed the 
van was related to the theft 
and followed it. The van drove through a stop 
sign, sped away, and then slowed when two 
occupants bailed out and fled on foot. A canine 
unit was called to the scene and the dog handler 
noted the ignition had been tampered with. The 
handler believed the van had been stolen, that a 
crime had been committed, and that the suspects 
were fleeing from police to resist arrest. Police 
did not know how far the suspects had travelled, 
whether they were armed or dangerous, or 
whether they had a criminal record.  
 
A police dog was deployed using a 25’ tracking 
line. He tracked to a carport and bit the plaintiff, 
who was hiding under a parked car. The handler 
looked under the car and saw the screaming 
plaintiff grabbing at the dog’s head and ears and 
swinging the dog around under the car. The 
plaintiff was told to stop fighting, to show his 
hands, and to come out from under the car. He 
soon stopped and crawled out from under the car 
with the dog biting his arm. The handler 
commanded the dog to release the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his arm, 
including loss of soft tissue, nerve damage, and 
scarring, and required corrective surgery to 
transplant some dead muscle. The plaintiff sued 
the City of Vancouver and the dog handler in 
British Columbia Supreme Court alleging assault 
and battery in that the use of the police dog 
amounted to excessive force.  
 
The handler testified the dog was trained not to 
release a fighting and resisting suspect. He also 
said that it was unsafe to order the release of 
the plaintiff while under the car because the dog 
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would perceive any movement as a threat and re-
engage, perhaps to a different part of the 
suspect’s body. In the handler’s view, there were 
no alternate methods to find and arrest the 
plaintiff and the level of force used was 
determined by the plaintiff’s decision to hide and 
then fight the dog. 
 
After reviewing the Vancouver Police 
Department’s Regulations and Procedure Manual 
and hearing evidence about the “bite and hold” 
method used by the department, Justice Allan 
concluded the use of force used was justified 
under s.25(1) of the Criminal Code. Section 25(1) 
provides a defence to both civil and criminal 
liability provided the requirements of the section 
are satisfied. She found that up until the point 
that the plaintiff was initially bitten, the officer 
followed the standard procedures and guidelines 
in the use of police dogs. Further, the dog’s 
actions were predictable within the context of its 
training. While recognizing that a police officer is 
not expected to carefully measure the exact 
amount of force a situation requires, Justice 
Allan stated: 
 
The reasonableness of [the handler’s] actions 
on…falls to be determined in the light of the 
circumstances and not through the lens of 
hindsight…After the fact, it is obvious that 
[the plaintiff] was a young man, unarmed, 
without a criminal record and not dangerous. 
His judgment was impaired by heroin and he 
panicked.  However, those facts were unknown 
to [the handler] in the heat of a potentially 
dangerous pursuit and he was trained to 
anticipate an armed suspect who may be 
planning an ambush.  
……… 
I conclude that [the handler’s] use of force 
was justified within the criteria established 
by s. 25 of the Code:  he was a peace officer, 
authorized to arrest [the plaintiff] without a 
warrant; he acted on reasonable grounds, and 
the force used was necessary to apprehend 
and arrest the suspect. In all of the 
circumstances, including his concerns 
regarding the safety of himself, his dog and 
plaintiff, the handler] was justified in ordering 
[the dog] to disengage when he did so and not 
earlier.  The force used did not become 
excessive, unreasonable or inappropriate.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence as to what 
injuries, if any, [the plaintiff] suffered as a 
result of Constable Star’s alleged delay in 
releasing his dog.  
 
Neither the city nor the handler was found to be 
negligent and the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. 
However, if negligence had been proven, the 
plaintiff would have been awarded $30,000 for 
general damages, $2,000 for future special 
damages (revision surgeries), and $5,000 for loss 
of earning capacity.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
BC POLICE HONOURED 
 
Thirty-four of British 
Columbia’s finest police 
officers were honoured 
on November 30, 2003 at 
Government House in Victoria. They were 
selected by a committee comprised of 
representatives from the British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of Police and Police 
Services Division, Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General. Awards are presented for 
either valour or meritorious service. The criteria 
for the awards are as follows: 
 
Valour (gold coloured) is the highest award for a 
police officer in British Columbia and involves an 
act of exceptional valour in the face of extreme 
hazard. It is awarded to police officers who 
purposely took action for the benefit of others 
while knowing that, in doing so, they placed 
themselves at substantial risk of death or serious 
injury.  
 
Meritorious Service (silver coloured) is 
exemplary performance that enhances the image 
of police officers in British Columbia. It is 
awarded to police officers who clearly 
demonstrated that they acted in a manner 
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significantly beyond the standard normally 
expected.  
 
Awards of Valour 
 
Cst. Warren Brown, Delta Police Department, for 
single-handedly searching a burning commercial building 
to make sure no one was inside. 
 
Cst. Dan Crivello - currently serving with the RCMP, 
Ottawa Headquarters, Cst. Rosanne Komlos and 
Cst. James Splinter, New Hazelton RCMP 
detachment, for apprehending a violent suspect who 
was threatening fellow officers with an axe. 
 
Cst. Harold Harding, West Vancouver Police 
Department, for rescuing a woman from a burning 
residence. 
 
Sgt. Greg Kodak and Cst. Graham Orlick, 
Vancouver Police Department, for their multiple 
attempts to rescue an unconscious victim from a 
burning building. 
 
Sgt. Joseph Chu and Cst. Al Kussat, Vancouver 
Police Department, for scaling a 300-foot crane to 
rescue a suicidal woman. 
 
Cst. Tina Fuchs and Cst. Derrick Gibson, 
Vancouver Police Department, for apprehending a 
mentally unstable and violent man who initiated an 
armed attack. 
 
Cst. Allan Hester, Vancouver Police Department, for 
saving a suicidal woman's life after she jumped from a 
third story balcony. 
 
Cst. Paul Spencelayh, Victoria Police Department, 
for rescuing two people with disabilities from their 
burning residence.  
 
Meritorious Service 
 
S/Sgt. Paul Briggs, Abbotsford Police Department, 
for dedication of duty and tenacity in pursuing a seven-
year investigation that led to the conviction of a serial 
rapist. 
 
Cst. Jim Poulin, Delta Police Department, for 
dedication in establishing the Kidz 4 Success Kamp, a 
Delta community youth initiative. 
 
Sgt. Clark Russell, D/Cst. Barrie Cockle, Cst. 
Shannon Perkins, Cst. Harvey Stevenson and 
Cst. Brenda Kelly, Esquimalt Police Department  
(currently serving with the Victoria Police Department) 
for professionalism and tenacity during the 
investigation of three gang members whose arrests led 
to convictions of aggravated assault. 
 
Cst. Edward Luscombe, Queen Charlotte City RCMP 
Detachment (currently serving with the Terrace RCMP 
detachment) for compassion in establishing a memorial 
for 36 American servicemen who died in an aircraft 
accident in Sandspit, B.C. in 1952. 
 
Sgt. Barry Baxter and Sgt. Robert Turnbull, 
RCMP "E" Division Headquarters, for dedication and 
persistence during the lengthy and complex 
investigation of an organized crime group that was 
eventually convicted. 
 
Cst. Mark Naipaul (currently serving with the RCMP 
"E" Division Headquarters) Cst. Margo Halliday, 
Cst. A.J. Kassam, Surrey RCMP Detachment, for 
courage and quick action in saving the life of a suicidal 
man who attempted to jump from an 11th-floor balcony. 
 
D/Cst. Murray Rayment, Vancouver Police 
Department, for innovation in developing software 
applications for police crime analysis. 
 
Cst. Paul Verral (Retired), Vancouver Police 
Department, for dedication and tenacity in supporting 
the Missing Women's Task Force investigation. 
 
Sgt. Steven Ing and Cst. Penny Durrant, Victoria 
Police Department, for courage and professionalism in 
rescuing a suicidal woman from the fifth-story ledge of 
a building. 
 
Cst. Jonathan Sheldan, Victoria Police Department, 
for research and contributions to the National Peace 
Officers Memorial for four fallen Victoria police 
members.  
 
Cst. Derek Tolmie and Cst. Eric Ooms, Victoria 
Police Department, for courage and quick action in 
saving the life of a suicidal man attempting to jump 
from the sixth level of a parkade. 
 
Norman D. Simmons, Retired Chief Constable, 
Esquimalt Police Department, for outstanding service 
to policing in British Columbia. 
 
Source: http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/police_services/ 
honours/index.htm  [January 12, 2004] 
 
 Volume 4 Issue 1             www.jibc.bc.ca 
January/February 2004 
39
24-Hour Prohibition Fast Facts
 
24-hour prohibitions across BC 
(rounded to nearest 1,000) 
 
1998 44,000 
1999 45,000 
2000 42,000 
2001 44,000 
2002 40,000 
 
Source: ICBC Victoria Data Warehouse-
Contraventions (Jan 11, 2004) 
 
S.215 MVA:A SOBERING LOOK 
AT BC’s 24-HOUR ALCOHOL 
RELATED DRIVING 
PROHIBITION 
 
The 24-hour roadside 
driving prohibition found in 
British Columbia’s Motor 
Vehicle Act (MVA) is an 
important tool in addressing 
drinking and driving and the 
corresponding devastation it 
causes on our roadways. From 1998 to 2002 there 
were on average, approximately 43,000 24-hour 
prohibitions per year in British Columbia4. In 
2003, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
examined the nature of s.215 MVA and its 
effectiveness in banning motorists from driving, 
without court review at the time the prohibition 
is imposed. Justice Low stated5: 
 
It is difficult to conceive of a more 
appropriate summary procedure for removing 
drinking drivers from the roads than the 24-
hour suspension procedure under s. 215 of the 
statute. The peace officer must have 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing 
that the driver's ability to drive is affected 
by alcohol. It is impractical in the extreme for 
this belief to be subject to a judicial finding 
before the suspension can come into effect. 
The Legislature has chosen to create this 
procedure to permit peace officers to regulate 
driving privileges and protect the public. 
 
Most of the case law 
surrounding the 24-
hour driving 
prohibition arises 
from instances 
where drivers are 
charged with driving 
after the prohibition 
is issued, since there 
is little opportunity 
                                                 
4 ICBC Victoria Data Warehouse-Contraventions (Jan 11, 2004) 
5 Sigurdson v. British Columbia, 2003 BCCA 535 
to otherwise dispute the issuance of the 
prohibition in court. In cases where a person is 
charged with driving while prohibited they may 
seek to challenge the validity of the initial 
prohibition6. In fact, the Crown must present 
evidence with respect to whether the officer 
issuing the prohibition had reasonable and 
probable grounds to do so. It is not enough simply 
to present the Notice of Prohibition7. As a 
consequence, if the prohibition was not valid from 
inception the subsequent charge of driving while 
prohibited fails.  
 
Genesis 
 
The alcohol related 24-hour 
driving prohibition in today’s 
British Columbia MVA 
originates from the 1960’s in 
s.203. This section, later changed to s.214 and 
now s.215, initially required only that a police 
officer suspect the driver of a motor vehicle had 
consumed alcohol before a driver’s licence could 
be suspended. It read: 
 
A peace officer may, at any time or place on a highway 
or industrial road when he has reason to suspect that 
the driver of a motor vehicle has consumed alcohol, 
request the driver to drive the motor vehicle, under 
the direction of the peace officer, to the nearest place 
off the travelled portion of the highway or industrial 
road and there to surrender his driver's licence. 
[emphasis added] 
 
However, following a challenge to this section, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal8 ruled that the 
section, as it was worded, was procedurally unfair 
since it permitted suspension on mere suspicion of 
alcohol consumption, without notice or a hearing. 
Further, the court found the section too vague. 
Chief Justice Nemetz wrote: 
 
A plain reading of s.214(2) shows that it is 
riddled with vagueness. The provision allows a 
constable to order a roadside suspension on 
                                                 
6 See for example R. v. Sam [1975] BCJ No. 0508 (BCSC), R. v. Wolff (1979) 46 
CCC (2d) 467 (BCCA), R. v. McGowan, [1995] BCJ No. 1100 (BCPC), R. v. Van Groen, 
[1997] BCJ No. 1175 (BCSC), R. v. Sengara, [1988] BCJ No. 673 (BCSC) 
7 R. v. Lam [2002] BCJ No. 2566 (BCPC) 
8 R. v. Robson, 19 CCC (3d) 137 (BCCA) 
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mere suspicion that the driver had consumed 
alcohol. No amount of such consumption is set 
out. No limitation as to when the consumption 
took place is mentioned and, what is most 
important, the suspension can be made 
regardless of whether the person’s ability to 
drive is affected. 
 
In response to the court’s decision, the provincial 
government amended the legislation. The concept 
of reasonable and probable grounds was added to 
replace the standard of suspicion. Further, it was 
also necessary that the person’s ability to drive 
be affected by alcohol. It was no longer enough 
simply to suspect alcohol consumption. The 
section was changed to read: 
 
A peace officer may, at any time or place on a highway 
or industrial road when he has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that a driver’s ability to 
drive a motor vehicle is affected by alcohol, request 
the driver to drive the motor vehicle, under the 
direction of the peace officer, to the nearest place 
off the travelled portion of the highway or industrial 
road and there to surrender his driver's licence. 
 
Today, police officers are empowered under s.215 
MVA to suspend a driver’s licence for 24 hours. 
The section now reads: 
 
s.215(2) Motor Vehicle Act 
A peace officer may, at any time or place on a highway 
or industrial road if the peace officer has reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that a driver’s ability 
to drive a motor vehicle is affected by alcohol, 
(a) request the driver to drive the motor vehicle, 
under the direction of the peace officer, to the 
nearest place off the traveled portion of the 
highway or industrial road, 
(b) serve the driver with a notice of driving 
prohibition, and 
(c) if the driver is in possession of a driver’s licence, 
request the driver to surrender that licence. 
 
Subsection 215(3) provides a similar authority for 
instances where the officer reasonably believes a 
motorist’s driving ability is affected by a drug, 
other than alcohol. This drug related provision is 
mentioned for reference only and will no longer be 
discussed. 
 
A driver is defined in s.215(1) as including “a 
person having the care or control of a motor 
vehicle on a highway or industrial road whether or 
not the motor vehicle is in motion.” Care or 
control is not defined and there is no presumption 
in the MVA similar to that found in the Criminal 
Code9, which deems a person in the driver’s seat 
as a person in care or control. However, “care or 
control” is a much broader concept than the 
specific and narrow concept of driving10. 
Therefore, each circumstance will need to be 
assessed by the investigating officer to 
determine whether the person was driving or was 
in care or control.  
 
For example, in R. v. Berlin [1991] BCJ No. 2525 
(BCSC), a police officer prohibited a driver after 
attending a single vehicle, single occupant motor 
vehicle accident in which the vehicle had flipped 
and was left inoperable. The driver was not 
injured and was standing by the road when police 
arrived a few minutes after the accident 
happened. The trial judge concluded that at the 
time the police officer arrived on scene, the 
driver had in effect became a pedestrian and 
therefore the officer had no power to proceed 
under s.214. The case was appealed and the 
British Columbia Supreme Court came to a 
different conclusion. Justice Prowse stated: 
 
…I have concluded that the aim of s.214 is not 
limited “to stopping a driver from starting to 
drive a parked vehicle that is already on the 
road or from continuing to drive a vehicle 
already on the road” [in the words of the trial 
judge] but rather extends to stopping a driver 
from driving any vehicle for which his licence 
is surrendered. 
 
Furthermore, Justice Prowse found “there is 
nothing in the words of the section that either 
expressly or impliedly, indicate that the fact the 
vehicle be operable is a condition precedent to 
the application of this section.”  
 
                                                 
9 See s.258 Criminal Code of Canada 
10 R. v. Steeden [1995] BCJ No. 1413 (BCCA) 
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Having Driver Move Vehicle 
 
Although s.215(2) allows the police 
officer to “request the driver to 
drive the motor vehicle, under the 
direction of the peace officer, to 
the nearest place off the traveled portion of the 
highway or industrial road” after their belief is 
formed, it is not a condition precedent to a valid 
prohibition. As Chief Justice Nemetz stated in R. 
v. Wolff (1979) 46 CCC (2d) 467 (BCCA): 
 
…it seems to me that the effectiveness of the 
demand to surrender a driver’s licence is not 
conditional on the driver’s moving the car to 
the nearest place off the traveled portion of 
the highway. I can conceive of situations 
where a car might not be moveable from the 
traveled portion of the highway, and yet the 
condition of the driver is such that the police 
officer can properly demand that he surrender 
his licence so that he would not drive, or 
attempt to drive, any other vehicle. 
 
In an earlier decision, Justice Monroe in R. v. Sam 
[1975] BCJ No. 0508 (BCSC) held the request to 
move the vehicle was discretionary. In other 
words, a police officer may request the vehicle be 
moved, but they need not do so. As the justice 
noted, “the provisions of the section become 
absurd where, for example, the driver was 
obviously incapable of driving the vehicle or the 
vehicle was so disabled as to be incapable of being 
driven or the vehicle had already been driven off 
the traveled portion of the highway before the 
officer spoke to the driver.” 
 
In R. v. Brick [1995] BCJ No. 3005 (BCPC) a police 
officer formed the opinion a driver was mildly 
impaired by alcohol, but before demanding 
samples he had the driver pull the vehicle ahead 
30 feet and park it on the shoulder, as s.214(2) 
(now s.215(2)) permitted, because it was blocking 
an apartment entrance. The accused provided 
breath samples and was charged with driving over 
80mg%. At his trial, he argued that the 
certificate of qualified technician ought to be 
excluded because the officer failed to make the 
demand “forthwith as soon as practicable” when 
he delayed the demand by asking the driver to 
move his car. It was further contended by the 
accused that the court should not condone a 
police officer directing a suspected impaired 
driver to set their vehicle in motion, thereby 
committing an offence under s.253 of the 
Criminal Code.  
 
Justice Saunderson rejected both of these 
arguments. The exercise of the officer’s 
statutory discretion to have the accused move his 
car did not result in an unreasonable delay and it 
was exercised legitimately and properly. Although 
the court noted the officer had three options—
move the vehicle himself, have the driver move it, 
or have it towed—the justice ruled, “The courts 
ought not to lightly interfere with the practical 
judgments the police are so frequently called 
upon to make in the course of their duties.”  
 
Surrender of Driver’s Licence 
 
When a police officer 
asks a driver to 
surrender their licence, 
s.215(4) places an 
obligation on the driver 
to surrender it at the 
time of request, whether a British Columbia 
licence or otherwise. Section 215(4) reads: 
 
s.215(4) Motor Vehicle Act 
If a peace officer requests a driver to surrender his or 
her driver’s licence under this section, the driver must 
forthwith surrender to the peace officer his or her 
driver’s licence issued under this Act or any document 
issued under another jurisdiction that allows him or her 
to drive or operate a motor vehicle. 
 
Once a notice of prohibition is issued, the 
motorist is prohibited from driving any vehicle, 
not just the one they were stopped in or were in 
care and control of11, for a period of 24 hours. 
Section 215(5) reads: 
 
 
                                                 
11 R. v. Berlin, [1991] BCJ No. 2525 (BCSC) 
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s.215(5) Motor Vehicle Act 
Unless the prohibition from driving a motor vehicle is 
terminated…the driver is automatically prohibited from 
driving a motor vehicle for a period of 24 hours from 
the time the peace officer served the driver with a 
notice of driving prohibition…[emphasis added] 
 
Constitutional Concerns 
 
Section 7 of the Charter protects a person’s 
right to life, liberty and security of their person. 
However, there is no Charter right to drive a 
motor vehicle on a public highway. Driving is not a 
liberty protected by s.7, but rather a privilege12. 
Furthermore, a 24-hour driving prohibition is 
neither an offence13 nor punishment14, but rather 
a civil disability15. Therefore, charging someone 
with impaired driving while also issuing a 24-hour 
driving prohibition does not violate s.12 of the 
Charter protecting persons from cruel and 
unusual punishment16. Nor does it create a double 
jeopardy situation under s.11(h) of the Charter17 
(when a prohibition is served and the person is 
also convicted of impaired driving) or violate the 
presumption of innocence protection under 
s.11(d), because a person is not charged with an 
offence18. On the other hand, the mandatory 
minimum sentence of 7 days imprisonment arising 
from a conviction for driving while suspended as a 
result of a 24-hour prohibition was held to be 
unconstitutional because it amounted to cruel and 
unusual punishment19, despite an earlier decision 
concluding that the 7 day minimum did not 
contravene the Charter20. The right to counsel 
under s.10(b) of the Charter will be discussed 
later. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Buhlers v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 1999 BCCA 114. 
13 R. v. Demaniuk [1983] BCJ No. 221 (BCSC), Sigurdson v. British Columbia, 2003 
BCCA 535 
14 R. v. Nguyen [1993] BCJ No. 586 (BCPC), R. v. Shaw [1991] BCJ No. 221 (BCSC), R. 
v. Art [1987] BCJ No. 2158 (BCCA) 
15 R. v. Nguyen [1993] BCJ No. 586 (BCPC) 
16 R. v. Shaw [1991] BCJ No. 221 (BCSC) 
17 R. v. Art [1987] BCJ No. 2158 (BCCA) 
18 Sigurdson v. British Columbia, 2003 BCCA 535 
19 R. v. Tommasi, [1997] BCJ No. 3040 (BCPC), R. v. Stasuk, 2002 BCPC 123, R. v. 
McKenzie, [2001] BCJ No. 2415 (BCPC) 
20 R. v. Knoche, [1994] BCJ No. 2102 (BCSC) 
The Standard 
 
The legal standard for prohibition is one of 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe a 
person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle is 
affected by alcohol. The reasonable and probable 
grounds standard requires a subjective belief 
supported by objective criteria21.  
 
Synonymously, reasonable and probable grounds 
has been referred to as reasonable grounds22, 
strong reason to believe23, credibly based 
probability24, reasonable probability25, reasonable 
belief26, reasonable and probable cause to 
believe27. It is not enough simply to say the 
person was affected by alcohol. Rather, the 
officer must be able to properly articulate the 
reasons for coming to their conclusion, which in 
turn must be objectively reasonable, such as 
physical observations, field sobriety tests, driving 
evidence, or roadside screening device results. 
 
Although common parlance would suggest terms 
such as intoxicated, drunk, inebriated, or 
impaired are synonymous and interchangeable, 
three distinct terms concerning the level of 
influence alcohol has on a person can be found in 
common federal or provincial statutes; 
intoxicated (appearing in s.41 of the Liquor 
Control and Licensing Act (LCLA)), impaired 
(appearing in s.253 of the Criminal Code), and 
affected (appearing in s.215 MVA). It would 
therefore be prudent to review these three 
standards in order to understand the minimum 
legal benchmark required for the service of a 24-
hour driving prohibition. 
 
                                                 
21 R. v. Van Goen [1997] BCJ No. 1175 (BCSC) 
22 Hunter v. Southam (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (SCC) 
23 Hunter v. Southam (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (SCC) at p.114. 
24 Hunter v. Southam (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (SCC) at p.115. 
25 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (SCC)  per Wilson at p.1166. 
26 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (SCC)  per Wilson at p.1166. 
27 R. v. Proulx (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (QueCA) 
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Intoxicated 
 
Under s.41 of the LCLA, it is an arrestable 
offence for a person to be or remain in a public 
place while intoxicated. The term intoxicated was 
defined in Besse v. Thom (1979) 96 D.L.R. (3d) 
657 (BCCoCrt.) reversed on other grounds (1979) 
107 D.L.R. (3d) 694 (BCCA) as follows: 
 
[T]he condition of being stupefied or drunk 
from the consumption of alcohol or drugs to 
such a marked degree that a person is a danger 
to himself or others or is causing a disturbance. 
[emphasis added] 
 
It appears that the level of inebriation 
contemplated by this definition is substantial. 
Like most subjective/objective standards, the 
test for intoxication under the LCLA is not 
whether the person was in fact intoxicated, but 
whether the person was "apparently" intoxicated 
to the police officer. The officer’s subjective 
belief must be supported by objective indicia28. 
 
Impaired 
 
There is no specific test for impairment under 
s.253 of the Criminal Code. Rather, it is an issue 
of fact whether the driver’s ability was impaired 
by alcohol (or drug). Any degree of impairment of 
the ability to drive, ranging from slight to great, 
will sustain a conviction29.  In R. v. Andrews (1996) 
104 CCC (3d) 392 (AltaCA) leave to appeal to 
Supreme Court of Canada refused 106 CCC (3d) 
vi, the majority of the court recognized a 
distinction between “slight impairment” generally, 
and “slight impairment of one’s ability to operate 
a motor vehicle” specifically. Justice Conrad 
stated: 
 
Every time a person has a drink, his or her 
ability to drive is not necessarily impaired. It 
may well be that one drink would impair one’s 
ability to do brain surgery, or one’s ability to 
thread a needle. The question is not whether 
the person’s functional ability is impaired to any 
degree. The question is whether the person’s 
                                                 
28 R. v. Ronnie [1999] B.C.J. No 813 (BCPC) 
29 R. v. Stellato,  (1993) 78 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (OntCA) affirmed Supreme Court of 
Canada [1994] 2 S.C.R. 478 
ability to drive is impaired to any degree by 
alcohol or a drug. In considering this question, 
judges must be careful not to assume that, 
where a person’s functional ability is affected in 
some respects by consumption of alcohol, his or 
her ability to drive is automatically impaired. 
 
The court also noted that when a person’s 
functional ability (like walking, talking, and 
performing basic tests of manual dexterity) was 
impaired by alcohol, a logical inference could be 
drawn that the ability to drive was also impaired. 
Absent driving pattern or expert testimony, a 
slight departure from normal conduct in most 
cases will not, however, lend itself to a safe 
conclusion that the ability to drive was impaired 
by alcohol. Rather, the more marked the 
departure from normal behaviour, the greater the 
indication, or inference, that one’s ability to drive 
is impaired.  
 
Affected 
 
The standard of being affected by alcohol is not 
defined in the MVA, but it “is clearly less than 
that of impairment.”30 As such, the motorist’s 
ability to drive need not be impaired, which would 
warrant charges under s.253 of the Criminal 
Code. However, there must be enough objective 
indicia to cause the officer to believe driving 
ability is affected by alcohol. But it is not enough 
simply to conclude that the driver has consumed 
alcohol, as was the requirement of the original 
provision in the 1960’s. The wording recommended 
for use by the Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General in imposing a prohibition 
reflects the legal standard: 
 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General card 
wording (01-05-25) 
I have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
your ability to drive a motor vehicle is affected by 
alcohol and I therefore direct you to surrender your 
driver’s licence. You are now prohibited from driving a 
motor vehicle for a period of 24 hours from this time 
and date. [emphasis added] 
 
                                                 
30 R. v. Mackenzie, 2001 BCPC 301 
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From the preceding information, it becomes 
evident that the affected standard is a lesser, 
but included standard of impairment. Thus, an 
officer need not form the opinion that a driver is 
impaired to issue a 24-hour prohibition. 
Furthermore, both affected and impaired are 
included standards of intoxication (see Figure 1).  
 
 
If a person were impaired and provided breath 
samples over 80mg%, they could be charged with 
Criminal Code offences under s.253, served an 
Administrative Driving Prohibition, and served a 
24-hour driving prohibition under the MVA. 
Similarly, if a person were to reach a state of 
intoxication, as defined by the courts for the 
purposes of the LCLA and be found driving or in 
care and control of a motor vehicle, all three 
statutes could apply (an arrest under s.41 LCLA, 
criminal charges under s.253 Criminal Code, and a 
24-hour MVA prohibition). 
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Section 10(b) of the 
Charter provides that an 
arrested or detained 
person has the right to 
retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to be informed of that right.  
 
s.10(b) Charter 
Everyone has the right on arrest or detention…(b) to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right… 
 
There is little doubt that a motorist is detained 
for constitutional purposes when they are 
stopped driving by the police31. However, during a 
s.215 investigation the police do not have to 
inform a person of their right to a lawyer. This 
has been held to be a reasonable limit under s.1 of 
the Charter. For example, in R. v. McGowan [1995] 
BCJ No. 1100 (BCPC), Justice Stansfield stated: 
 
In my view, however, the "operational 
requirements" of section 214 authorize a 
peace officer to undertake the initial 
investigation of a driver who appears to have 
been drinking, including a minimal roadside 
detention for that purpose, without having to 
advise of section 10 rights. It is intended to 
be a summary process. If the officer decides 
to let the driver go on his way, albeit with his 
liberty to drive suspended for 24 hours, 
rather than to require the driver to accompany 
him to the police station for a breathalyser 
test, then there is no requirement that the 
section 10(b) warning be given.  I believe that 
to be a reasonable limit on the section 10(b) 
Charter right, and one which will be in the 
interest of the many drivers who would rather 
receive the 24 hour prohibition than be 
exposed to the substantially greater jeopardy 
of a continuing criminal investigation and 
possible criminal conviction. 
……… 
On balance I have concluded it is more 
important that there remain this expeditious 
means of dealing with the enormous social 
problem of drinking and driving, giving rise as 
it does to a relatively minor limitation on 
personal liberty. To hold that the officer at 
the roadside in the preliminary stage of a 
drinking/driving investigation has to advise the 
person of his right to counsel (with the 
attendant obligations regarding making a 
telephone available, supplying duty counsel's 
number, and so on) would be to change 
fundamentally the operation of the process 
envisaged by the Legislature. 
 
Nor do the police have to advise of the right to 
counsel once the 24 hour prohibition is issued, 
since the driver “is no longer detained and no 
longer in control of the police”32. 
 
                                                 
31 see for example R. v. Nguyen, [1993] BCJ No. 586 (BCPC) 
32 R. v. Nguyen, [1993] BCJ No. 586 (BCPC) 
Figure 1 
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Even when the police administer roadside sobriety 
tests to raise their suspicions to the reasonable 
grounds standard required by this section, there 
is no need to provide a s.10(b) warning. In R. v. 
Bonin, (1989) 47 C.C.C. (3d) 230 (B.C.C.A.) leave to 
appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused 50 
C.C.C. (3d) vi, British Columbia’s top court ruled 
that the operational requirements of s.214, along 
with s.27(2) of the province’s Interpretation Act, 
implicitly permit the police to briefly delay 
informing the driver of their right to counsel 
until sobriety tests are complete. The court 
recognized the need for a police officer with a 
suspicion that a driver’s ability is affected by 
alcohol to have the necessary means to elevate 
that suspicion to the reasonable grounds standard 
required by s.214 (now s.215). The court 
concluded that even though the driver was 
detained when asked to perform physical co-
ordination tests, holding off in providing a s.10(b)  
warning was a reasonable limit prescribed by law 
under s.1 of the Charter.  
 
Terminating a Prohibition 
 
Subsections 215(6), and (7) create the statutory 
framework for terminating an alcohol related 
driving prohibition. Other than the expiration of 
24 hours, the driving prohibition may be 
terminated in two ways: 
 
• undergoing a “test” administered by a peace 
officer where blood alcohol content (BAC) 
does not exceed 50mg%; or 
 
• the driver produces a medical certificate 
signed after the prohibition stating their BAC 
does not exceed 50mg% (s.215(7)). 
 
Peace Officer Administered Test 
 
Section 215(6) allows for termination of a 
prohibition if the driver forthwith requests and 
does undergo a test that indicates a BAC not in 
excess of 50mg%. Interesting, the original 
legislation (s.203 as it was then) required a BAC 
not in excess of 80mg%, consistent with the 
Criminal Code level. The section today reads: 
s.215(6) Motor Vehicle Act 
If a driver, who is served with a notice of driving 
prohibition under subsection (2), forthwith requests a 
peace officer to administer and does undergo as soon 
as practicable a test that indicates that his or her 
blood alcohol level does not exceed 50 mg of alcohol in 
100 mL of blood, the prohibition from driving is 
terminated 
 
The type of test required under this section is 
not specified. However, in R. v. Brush (1977) 35 
CCC (2d) 177 (BCSC), the accused argued that the 
“test”, referred to in s.203 as it was then, 
referred to the “Borkenstein Breathalyzer test”. 
In rejecting this argument, Justice Murray 
stated: 
 
…s203(3)(a) refers only to “a test”. It does 
not refer to a “Borkenstein Breathalyzer test” 
and it is clear that there are various other 
tests which a driver can take which will 
indicate that his venous blood contains more or 
less alcohol than that indicated by the 
subsection. Other “tests” that occur to me are 
blood tests, urine tests and even physical 
tests. 
 
Although the legislation describes only a “test”, 
the standard prohibition wording provided by the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General 
uses the phrase “breath test” (see below), while 
the reverse of the driver’s copy of the “Notice of 
24-Hour Prohibition” uses the phrase 
“breathalyzer test” (see below).  
 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General card 
wording (01-05-25) 
However, if you do not accept this prohibition, you have 
a right to either request a breath test or obtain a 
certificate from a medical practitioner. In the event 
that your blood alcohol level is shown not to exceed 50 
milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood by the 
test or certificate, this prohibition from driving is 
terminated. [emphasis added] 
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Impaired Driving Fast Facts 
 
Canada (2002) 
 
• 94% of impaired driving offences are impaired driving
simpliciter or BAC exceeding 80mg%. Failure to provide a
breath or blood sample account for 5% of offences while
impaired causing bodily harm or death account for 1%. 
• Saskatchewan had the highest provincial rate of impaired
driving charges at 618 per 100,000, while the Northwest
Territories was the highest overall at 1,038 per 100,000
followed by the Yukon at 764. Newfoundland has the lowest
rate of impaired driving charges at 183 per 100,000. Of
Canada’s 25 Census Metropolitan Areas, Regina had the
highest rate of impaired driving at 383 per 100,000. 
• Impaired driving rates are highest: 
 among males (87%) 
 among adults 19 to 24 years 
 during weekends (Friday-Sunday) 
 during early morning hours (midnight-4am) 
 during June 
• Impaired driving rates are lowest: 
 among females (13%) 
 among adults 65 and older 
 on Tuesdays 
 during January and February 
• The conviction rate for impaired driving is 73%. 
• In PEI, 91% of impaired drivers receive imprisonment, while in
Nova Scotia only 4% do. However, the average sentence in
PEI is only 17 days while in Nova Scotia it is 182 days. 
• The median time from first court appearance to case
completion was 99 days. 38% of cases received five or more
appearances. 
• In 1982 there were 143,424 impaired drivers charged, while 20
years later (2002) there were only 66,682 people charged. 
 
Source: Juristat. Statistics Canada. Impaired Driving and Other Traffic 
Offences-2002.Vol.23, no.9  
 
British Columbia  
 
• In 2001, 118 people died in alcohol related crashes. 
• Only 17% of BC residents believe a drinking driver would be
convicted of impaired driving. 
• 40% of police officers were reluctant to proceed with or
recommend a criminal charge because drivers were unlikely
to be convicted.  
• The conviction rate for impaired driving in BC is 70%. 
• Between 1995 and 2001 the number of impaired driving
charges recommended by police decreased from 8,738 to
6,932, while the number of 24-hour prohibitions increased
from 38,791 to 43,923 during the same period. 
 
Source: Drinking and Driving Issues and Strategies in British Columbia.
Discussion Paper. June 2003. #PSSG03025-1 
 
 
Arguably, a breath test could include both 
approved instruments, such as the BAC 
Datamaster C, or approved screening devices, 
such as the Alcometer SL-2 or Alco-Sensor IV. 
Usually these approved screening devices are 
calibrated to provide a warning when the breath 
sample exceeds 50mg%. Therefore, in the 
absence of a “warn” or “fail” reading, the 
prohibition would be terminated. 
 
Although the standard prohibition wording 
provided by the Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General has a paragraph explaining how a 
prohibition can be terminated, “the validity of [a 
driver’s] suspension [is] not affected by the 
failure of the officer to inform [the driver] of 
the means by which [the] suspension could be 
terminated.”33 In other words, the prohibition is 
valid even if the officer does not explain the 
contents of s.215(6) or (7). However, if the driver 
raises the issue of BAC with the police officer, it 
is incumbent on the officer then to advise the 
driver of ss.215(6) and (7)34. As well, the testing 
provision arises after the prohibition is served, 
not before, and a test need not be given as a 
matter of course before imposing the prohibition. 
 
Obligation to Administer Breath Test 
 
In R. v. Jewer, (1989) 16 M.V.R. (2d) 70 (BCCoCrt) 
the accused requested a breathalyzer test under 
s.214(6) (now s.215(6)), but the officer refused 
because he did not believe the accused would blow 
over 80mg%. The Provincial Court trial judge 
ruled that when ss. (6) and (7) were read 
together, the officer was given the discretion as 
                                                 
33 R. v. Nguyen, [1993] BCJ No. 586 (BCPC), see also R. v. Wolff (1979) 46 C.C.C. 
(2d) 467 (BCCA) 
34 R. v. MacLennan [1984] BCD Crim Conv 5766-02 (BCPC) 
Reverse of Notice of 24-Hour Prohibition (MV 2634-
071998) 
If you do not accept this prohibition, you have the 
right to either request a breathalyzer test or obtain a 
certificate from a medical practitioner. In the event 
your blood alcohol is shown not to exceed 50 milligrams 
of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood by the test or 
certificate, this prohibition is terminated. [emphasis 
added] 
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to whether or not a breath test was 
administered. The accused appealed. Justice 
Godfrey of the British Columbia County Court 
concluded that the officer’s exercise of 
discretion in not administering a breath test was 
unreasonable and arbitrary, which invalidated the 
24-hour suspension. Justice Godfrey stated: 
 
When I look at the wording of the legislation, 
it seems to me that implicit in the use of the 
phrase "forthwith requests a peace officer to 
administer and does undergo as soon as 
practicable ..." is an obligation on the part of 
the police officer to not unreasonably refuse 
such a request...The whole point of s. 214(6) is 
to allow a citizen an opportunity to prove that 
he is below .05 and the police are the only 
people who possess the breathalyzer machines. 
The officer's refusal was completely 
unreasonable in the circumstances and as such, 
I am satisfied vitiates the licence suspension. 
This is not a case where there was some other 
emergency that prevented him from providing 
the test or a problem with locating a 
breathalyzer machine. The only reason here 
for the refusal was that he did not believe a 
Criminal Code charge would result from 
allowing the accused to take a breath test and 
to my mind, that makes this refusal to provide 
a test unreasonable on the part of the police 
officer. 
 
Medical Certificate 
 
Section 215(7) provides for a second method of 
terminating a prohibition. It allows for a driver to 
produce a medical certificate signed after the 
prohibition stating their BAC does not exceed 
50mg%. It reads: 
 
s.215(7) Motor Vehicle Act 
If a driver who is served with a notice of driving 
prohibition under subsection (2) produces, to a peace 
officer having charge of the matter, a certificate of a 
medical practitioner that 
(a) states that the blood alcohol level of the driver 
did not exceed 50 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood 
at the time the certificate was signed, and 
(b) was signed after he or she was prohibited from 
driving, 
the prohibition from driving is terminated. 
A plain reading of this section permits the driver 
to produce a medical certificate anytime within 
the 24-hour prohibited period, thereby 
terminating the driving prohibition. This is 
different than s.215(6) which requires the “test” 
forthwith. 
 
The Significance of 50mg% BAC 
 
Section 215 does not create a 
per se BAC legal limit for 
driving in British Columbia. 
Under s.215(9), it is not 
necessary that a police officer 
hold the opinion that a driver’s 
BAC exceeds 50mg% before a person’s licence is 
suspended nor does a breath test have to be 
given in order to impose a prohibition. In other 
words, the officer need only believe, on 
reasonable and probable grounds, that driving 
ability is affected by alcohol. It is not necessary 
that the police obtain a confirmatory breath test. 
But, as previously mentioned, if the driver 
chooses to undergo a test forthwith and the 
results indicate a level not in excess of 50mg%, 
the prohibition is terminated. Similarly, if the 
driver opts for producing a medical certificate 
(<50mg%) anytime within the 24 hour period, the 
prohibition is also terminated. 
 
This is different, for example, from s.253 of the 
Criminal Code. In that section, there are two 
separate and distinct offences; impaired driving 
(or care or control) and drive (or care or control) 
while over 80mg%. A person could be convicted of 
impaired driving with a BAC below 80mg% or 
convicted of over 80mg% without sufficient 
evidence to convict on impaired driving. Compare 
this to s.215, although not a charge, which 
requires reasonable and probable grounds driving 
ability is affected by alcohol, independent of any 
reading. The only link to a BAC of 50mg involves 
the provision that terminates the prohibition. 
 
In the discussion paper entitled, Drinking and 
Driving Issues and Strategies in British Columbia 
(June 2003), the authors note that currently a 
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24-hour prohibition is only available if the police 
have reason to believe driving ability is affected 
by alcohol, not whether BAC is greater than 
50mg%. As a proposed strategy, it was 
recommended that a 24-hour prohibition be 
established that is connected to a BAC measured 
on an approved screening device.  
 
Despite the absence of a link to a threshold BAC, 
the question still remains whether the knowledge 
of a reading from an approved screening device 
can provide the necessary grounds to meet the 
requirement that a person’s ability to drive is 
affected by alcohol? In other words, if a police 
officer is aware a person has a BAC greater than  
50mg%, can the officer infer ability to drive is 
affected by alcohol to the reasonable and 
probable grounds standard? 
 
In a recent Alberta Court of Appeal judgment35, 
the Court ruled, “it is clear that a breathalyzer 
reading can itself be relied on as evidence of 
impairment”.  In this case, two experts testified 
that impairment occurs in all persons at BAC 
levels in excess of 100 mg%. If a breathalyzer 
reading (through the certificate of analysis) can 
be used as strong evidence proving impairment to 
the criminal standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, what would preclude a roadside 
screening device reading from being used as 
reasonable grounds to believe a person’s ability is 
affected by alcohol?  
 
There is a body of empirical, or scientific, 
evidence suggesting that impairment has been 
reported at relatively low alcohol levels. In the 
Canadian text Drugs and Drug Abuse36 its authors 
write: 
 
In general we can say that well-learned tasks 
are less affected by alcohol than are newly 
learned tasks, and the tasks akin to natural 
movement are also less affected. However, 
driving is not just a composite of individual 
tasks such as stopping or starting. Its related 
tasks involve the brain’s ability to process 
                                                 
35 R. v. Eliuk, 2002 ABCA 85 
36 Addiction Research Foundation (1998) Toronto, ON: The Addiction and Mental 
Health Services Corporation  
information and to make judgments, and 
alcohol has a much greater deleterious effect 
on processing information than on physical 
skills. 
 
Driving is a “divided-attention task.” That is, it 
involves several simultaneous tasks. Impaired 
drivers whose physical driving skills may not be 
adversely affected by relatively low blood 
alcohol levels may nevertheless become 
involved in accidents because they cannot 
integrate quickly enough the many pieces of 
information that must suddenly be considered 
in an emergency or in a suddenly complicated 
driving situation. [p.60] 
 
And further: 
 
Drivers should be reminded that their reaction 
time and judgment can be affected even if 
they “feel sober” after drinking. Even low 
levels of alcohol consumption are associated 
with slowed reaction time and decreased 
ability to handle complex driving situations. 
[p.269] 
 
In a 2000 report commissioned by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration entitled A Review 
of the Literature on the Effects of Low Doses of 
Alcohol on Driving-Related Skills, Moskowitz and 
Fiorentino reviewed 112 scientific articles 
regarding the effect of alcohol on driving-related 
skills. In examining 13 behavioural areas including 
driving, divided attention, drowsiness, 
psychomotor skills, cognitive tasks, tracking, 
choice reaction time, vigilance, perception, and 
simple reaction time, the following was reported: 
 
In some cases impairment was reported at 
BACs as low as [9mg%]. By the time subjects 
reach BACs of [30mg%], the number of 
impaired behavioral areas is greater than the 
number not impaired. As BACs increase, the 
number of areas showing impairment increase. 
[3.2] 
 
Further, they reported this major finding: 
 
This review of the literature provides strong 
evidence that impairment of some driving-
related skills begins with any departure from 
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zero BAC. By [50mg%] the majority of studies 
have reported impairment by alcohol. By BACs 
of [80mg%], 94% of the studies reviewed 
reported impairment. [4.1] 
 
Since reasonable and probable grounds (credibly 
based probability37) is a lower standard than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and affected is 
a lesser, but included standard of impairment, it 
stands to reason that based on scientific 
research and scholarly opinion, that a breath test 
indicating a driver’s BAC in excess of 50mg% 
would provide the grounds necessary to impose a 
24-hour prohibition. It is not the reading itself 
that warrants the prohibition, but making a 
rational inference from the research that 
suggests the majority of people are impaired 
(which includes affected) at 50mg%.   
 
The ASD Trump Card 
 
Section 254(2) of the Criminal 
Code allows a police officer to 
demand a sample of a driver’s 
breath into an approved 
screening device if the officer 
has a reasonable suspicion the 
driver has any alcohol in their 
body. The provision reads: 
 
S.254(2) Criminal Code 
Where a peace officer reasonably suspects that a 
person who is operating a motor vehicle …or who has 
the care or control of a motor vehicle…, whether it is in 
motion or not, has alcohol in the person's body, the 
peace officer may, by demand made to that person, 
require the person to provide forthwith such a sample 
of breath as in the opinion of the peace officer is 
necessary to enable a proper analysis of the breath to 
be made by means of an approved screening device and, 
where necessary, to accompany the peace officer for 
the purpose of enabling such a sample of breath to be 
taken. 
 
The legal standard is a reasonable suspicion of 
alcohol consumption alone, not the amount or 
behavioural consequences of the consumption38. 
                                                 
37 Hunter v. Southam (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (SCC) at p.115. 
38 R. v. Gilroy [1987] A.J. No. 822 (AltaCA) 
Nor does the officer need to believe a crime, 
such as impaired driving or over 80mg%, has been 
committed. Rather, the test is only a reasonable 
suspicion of the existence of alcohol in the 
person’s body39. As a matter of practice then, a 
roadside breath sample can be demanded from a 
driver on a reasonable suspicion of alcohol 
consumption. There is no need to believe the 
person’s ability to drive is affected or impaired 
by alcohol. Thus, a roadside sample can be 
demanded on a reasonable suspicion of 
consumption and the readings, if appropriate, can 
be used to support reasonable and probable 
grounds. The right to counsel under s.10(b) of the 
Charter is also suspended when a roadside 
screening device demand is made. It has been 
held to be a reasonable limit, demonstrably 
justified under s.1 of the Charter40. 
 
Document Service 
 
Under s.215(2) MVA the 
driver may be served a 
notice of driving 
prohibition. This notice 
must be in a form 
established by the 
Insurance Corporation 
of British Columbia 
(ICBC) (s.215(11) MVA) 
and, unless terminated 
under s.215(6) MVA 
(peace officer 
administered test not 
exceeding 50mg%), must 
be delivered to ICBC 
(s.215(10) MVA). Therefore, if a driver produces 
a medical certificate (BAC not in excess of 
50mg%), the Notice of Driving Prohibition is 
nonetheless submitted to ICBC, presumably still 
forming part of the driver’s record. On the other 
hand, a prohibition terminated by a test under 
s.215(6) is not forwarded to ICBC and will not be 
reflected on the driver’s record. 
                                                 
39 R. v. Lindsay (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 159 (OntCA), see also R. v. MacPherson (2000) 
150 CCC (3d) 540 (OntCA) 
40 R. v. Thomsen (1988) 40 CCC (3d) 411 (SCC) 
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Summary 
 
Section 215 MVA is a summary procedure that 
allows a police officer to prohibit a motorist from 
driving for 24 hours if the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe driving ability is affected by 
alcohol. There is no need to believe an alcohol 
related crime has been committed, nor is it 
necessary that the influence alcohol has on the 
driver meets the impaired standard. All that is 
required is an honest belief, justifiable from an 
objective point of view, that driving ability is 
affected by alcohol. The objective component 
imposes a responsibility on the police to act with 
restraint and after careful assessment41 while 
serving to avoid and provide a safeguard against 
arbitrary and indiscriminate police action, 
preventing officers from being the ultimate 
judges of their own decisions42. No right to 
counsel warnings are necessary during the 215 
investigation, nor is one necessary when the 
prohibition is served. 
 
Once issued, the driver has two options in which 
to terminate the prohibition. One is to forthwith 
request the administration of a test by the 
officer, which must not be unreasonably refused.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 R. v. Sundquist (2000) 145 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (SaskCA) at p.158. 
42 R. v. Perrault [1992] R.J.Q. 1848 (QueCA) 
The second involves the driver obtaining and 
subsequently producing a medical certificate. In 
both cases, the driving prohibition will end if the 
driver’s BAC does not exceed 50mg%. In the 
former, the Notice of Prohibition is not 
submitted to ICBC while in the latter case it is.  
 
If the driving prohibition is submitted to ICBC it 
will be entered on the recipient’s driving record. 
A driver with one or more 24-hour prohibitions on 
their driving record within a two-year period may 
face a longer driving prohibition by the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles. 
 
Procedurally, it makes sense simply to read the 
24-hour roadside prohibition from the card 
provided to police officers by the Ministry of 
Public Safety and Solicitor General. This explains 
the recourse available to the driver under which 
the prohibition may be terminated, avoiding any 
legal challenges as to whether the driver was 
properly advised of his options.   
 
Editor’s Comments: The editor would like to 
thank Ms. Jill Walker, Director Hearings and 
Appeals, Office of the Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles for her feedback on this article. 
2002 Canadian Impaired Driving Rates (including rates of imprisonment and average sentence length) 
Province/Territory BC AB SK MB ON QC NB NF NS PEI YK NT NU 
Impaired Driving Rate* 211 417 618 314 202 276 311 183 251 351 764 1,038 314 
% Imprisoned 8% 10% 6% n/a 19% 10% 13% 28% 4% 91% 14% n/a n/a 
Avg. Sentence (days) 112 69 53 n/a 58 141 47 77 182 17 59 n/a n/a 
* per 100,000 people, n/a=not available 
Source: Juristat. Statistics Canada. Impaired Driving and Other Traffic Offences-2002.Vol.23, no.9 
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Note-able Quote 
 
Each day is an opportunity to change everything—
Joe Roberts 
 
WCB COP CASES 
 
The following are a number of 
recent WCB review cases involving 
police officers. The full report of 
these decisions are available at 
www.worksafebc.com. 
 
Incident: Curling 
Review reference#:5453 
Date: December 1, 2003 
 
The worker, a police 
officer, injured his knee 
while competing in an all 
police curling bonspiel. The 
worker was scheduled to 
work a few days before the date of injury, but 
was granted administrative leave with full salary 
so he could represent the department. The 
worker’s application for compensation was denied 
because he was involved in a recreational activity 
not covered by the Workers Compensation Act. 
He requested a review of the Board’s decision and 
sought medical costs and wage loss benefits, 
arguing the purpose of the bonspiel was to foster 
good community relations, monies raised went to 
charities, and that fitness is a job requirement. 
 
The reviewing officer denied the worker’s 
request and confirmed the Board’s decision. WCB 
Policy states that recreational, exercise, or 
sports activities are not normally considered part 
of a worker’s employment except in exceptional 
cases. Because the worker was on administrative 
leave, the sports activity fell outside working 
hours. As such the WCB has developed policy 
guidelines in cases involving police officers. 
Factors to be considered include employer 
directed participation, public relations, full wages 
paid, employer team financial support, team 
composed of fellow employees, and no involvement 
with commercial team or recreational league. In 
this case the worker met some of the guidelines, 
but not all. He was paid full salary for missed 
shifts, the team was made up of only police 
officers, and did not involve a commercial team or 
recreational league. However, participation was 
voluntary and the employer did not fund or 
subsidize the activity. Furthermore, community 
members were not allowed to participate and the 
bonspiel’s primary focus was competition among 
police officers, even though money raised was 
used for charity.  This case did not meet the 
criteria for an exceptional case. 
 
Incident: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Review reference:#2622 
Date: December 1, 2003 
 
The worker, a 36-year old police officer who had 
7 previous WCB claims, was attacked by a man 
with a knife in 1998, but was not physically 
injured. He received assistance from his 
department’s trauma team and was of work for a 
short period on paid administrative leave. He was 
subsequently diagnosed with Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder and received treatment from a 
psychologist. In 2002, the worker found out the 
attacker only received a 6-week conditional 
sentence and experienced an anxiety attack. The 
worker applied for compensation but his claim was 
denied because he did not submit the forms 
within the required one-year time period of the 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Injury (1998). 
 
The worker requested a review of the WCB 
decision claiming “special circumstances” that 
prevented him from submitting the form within 
one-year. He contended he did not submit the 
form because he was placed on administrative 
leave and believed his employer and psychologist 
were taking care of his claim. In the opinion of 
the reviewing officer the worker should have 
known from the day of the attack that Board 
benefits might be appropriate. Furthermore, he 
had an extensive record for WCB claims and was 
familiar with the WCB application policy at the 
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time of the attack. The worker’s request for a 
review was denied. 
 
Incident: Fall 
Review reference:#1927 
Date: November 6, 2003 
 
The worker, a 51-year old police officer, fell in a 
boat and suffered fractures to his mandible, 
which required surgery. As a result, his ability to 
open his mouth was restricted even after 
receiving physiotherapy. His claim for a 
permanent disability award was denied because he 
had no permanent functional impairment, only a 
number of subjective complaints. The worker 
requested a review of the decision. 
 
The review request was allowed and the decision 
was returned to the Board. In making their 
earlier decision, the Board did not have the 
benefit of two reports from the worker’s dentist, 
which demonstrated the worker’s mouth opening 
was on the low end of normal. The most recent 
report was evidence of a permanent reduction in 
mouth opening of 29%. The review officer 
ordered the worker’s mouth opening be measured 
by an oral medicine specialist and the decision was 
sent back to the Board to estimate the 
impairment of earning capacity and appropriate 
permanent partial disability award. 
 
 
Incident: Ozone Therapy Request 
Review reference:#4371 
Date: November 6, 2003 
 
The worker, a 51-year old police officer, received 
WCB benefits after it was determined that his 
multiple chronic symptoms, including bacterial and 
viral infections, arose from exposure to 
contaminated water after he entered a pond to 
assist the removal of a driver from an overturned 
vehicle. The worker had traveled to the United 
Kingdom to undergo ozone treatment, but was 
denied reimbursement for his travel expenses, 
and the early mortgage penalty payment and re-
mortgaging legal fees necessary for him to pay 
his living expenses. He requested a review of the 
Board’s decision. 
 
The worker’s requests were denied and the 
Board’s decision confirmed. Health Canada does 
not recognize benefits from ozone therapy and 
the treatments were not reasonably necessary to 
cure the worker’s compensable symptoms. 
Furthermore, the worker’s decision to re-
mortgage was purely a personal decision and its 
consequences, like early mortgage adjustment 
penalties and legal fees, are not the responsibility 
of the Board.  
 
Incident: Slipping 
Review Reference:#4759 
Date: November 6, 2003 
 
The worker, a 42-year old police officer 
responding to an urgent call for assistance, 
injured his right knee after running around a 
corner and slipping on some wet leaves. He 
reported this to his employer on the day of the 
injury. Assuming he had sprained his knee, the 
worker applied ice but did not seek medical 
attention. About two months later the worker’s 
knee had still not fully healed and he therefore 
sought medical attention and was diagnosed with a 
torn medial meniscus and sprain. However, his 
claim was rejected by WCB because there was no 
medical documentation to confirm that a work 
related injury occurred. The worker sought a 
review of the Board’s decision arguing it did not 
fully investigate the incident and the injury. The 
employer supported the Board’s decision 
submitting there was insufficient medical 
evidence of a work related injury.  
 
The reviewing officer accepted the worker’s 
request and the Board’s decision was varied. For a 
claim to be compensable, there are three 
requirements: 
 
1. a personal injury; 
2. the injury occurred while working; and 
3. the injury was caused by work. 
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The reviewing officer found ample evidence that 
the incident occurred while working and resulted 
from work. The remaining question, whether 
there was a personal injury, was also answered in 
the affirmative. The reviewing officer accepted 
the worker’s statement that his knee was swollen 
and remained partially swollen until he sought 
medical attention. In short, his symptoms were 
continuous from the date of injury until diagnosis. 
In this case, despite the lack of prompt medical 
attention, the worker did sustain a personal injury 
arising out of and in the course of his employment 
and therefore his claim was compensable.  
 
Incident: ERT Entry 
Review Reference:#1163 
Date: August 21, 2003 
 
The worker, a police 
officer and member 
of the Emergency 
Response Team 
(ERT), injured his 
back while using a 
35-pound ram to break down a door. He 
underwent a microsurgical discectomy, completed 
a Work Conditioning Program, and subsequently 
returned to full-time duties. WCB found he was 
left with a permanent partial disability and 
awarded him a partial disability of 7.59%. The 
worker sought a review of the Board’s decision, 
requesting the disability award be increased by 
2.5% because it did not accurately reflect his 
loss of earning capacity. He submitted that there 
are several things he can no longer do since the 
injury, which eliminated his opportunities for 
advancement within the department, and he also 
lost 5% in ERT specialist pay. Furthermore, he 
contended that the injury and chronic pain did not 
allow him to function in his usual employment. 
 
The reviewing officer denied the worker’s 
request and the Board’s decision was confirmed. 
The Workers Compensation Act allows WCB to 
estimate the impairment to earning capacity from 
the nature and degree of a worker’s injury. When 
there is both anatomic and/or surgical 
impairment, and a loss of range of motion in the 
spine, the final impairment rating is the greater 
of the two. In this case, the 7.59% award had 
appropriately considered and accounted for the 
worker’s pain symptoms, particularly since the 
worker had two previous non-compensable 
discectomies, one in 1977 and one in 1986, which 
were considered in the overall impairment rating.  
 
 
SAFETY ALERT 
 
Beware of the handcuff key belt buckle. The 
“post” of the buckle that threads through the 
belt hole is actually a handcuff key!!! 
 
 
OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING 
CONSENT ENTRY REASONABLE  
R. v. Erickson, 2003 BCCA 693 
 
The accused was arrested for 
assault against his girlfriend.  
His effects, including his house 
keys, were taken from him and 
he was lodged in cells. The 
accused asked the police that his parents be 
allowed to attend his home to remove his dog and 
obtain clothing for his two children. The 
investigating officer, who was considering 
obtaining a warrant and concerned the parents 
might remove potential evidence of the assault 
from the home, explained that they would arrange 
his request provided the police could accompany 
his parents into the home. A second officer, who 
knew nothing of the details of the assault 
investigation, was requested to accompany the 
parents and to ensure only children’s clothing and 
the dog were removed. The officer was also told 
to keep his eyes open in case he observed 
anything that might be evidence of an assault.  
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While in the house, a cat entered the main floor 
and the accused’s mother informed the officer 
that the cat did not belong in the house. The cat 
ran down the stairs, into the basement, and the 
officer gave chase to retrieve it. While in the 
basement retrieving the cat, the officer 
observed venting, electrical cords, and ballasts 
leading from a door under which light could be 
seen. Later, the accused’s mother took a bag of 
garbage from the home and placed it on the 
street along side other bags that had already 
been placed outside. The officer seized the 
garbage, took it to the police station, and found it 
to contain a bloody shirt and several marihuana 
seedlings.  
 
This, along with the observations, was reported to 
the investigator of the assault who made 
arrangements for a second visit later that day so 
the dog could be removed. A tele-search warrant 
was subsequently obtained under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act and evidence relating 
to a charge of unlawfully producing a controlled 
substance was seized. The entry and search were 
ruled lawful in British Columbia Supreme Court 
and the evidence was admitted 43. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the consent 
was invalid. He suggested, among other grounds, 
that he was not presented with a real alternative 
to the police entry of his home and, if proper 
consent was given to go into the home, it did not 
include entry into the basement.   
 
Consent 
 
In dismissing the appeal, Justice Saunders for 
the unanimous court first noted that a consent 
search is not unreasonable under s.8 of the 
Charter provided it is voluntary and properly 
informed. In this case, the trial judge was not in 
error when he concluded the accused’s consent 
was voluntary and that he was aware of the 
circumstances. Justice Saunders stated: 
 
                                                 
43 See R. v. Erickson, 2002 BCSC 785  
[T]he finding of the trial judge that consent 
was given by [the accused] has a solid 
foundation in the evidence.  It was not the 
police who initiated the entry.  They 
responded to the request for the keys to 
enable [the accused’s] mother…to enter and 
obtain clothes for the children and to deal 
with the dog.  [The accused] was, at the time, 
under arrest for assault and understood that 
he was in a position of some legal jeopardy. 
[para. 16] 
……… 
As to the suggestion implicit in the issue of 
the keys that the police used the keys to 
improperly obtain consent, I do not consider 
that the police were required to allow [the 
accused’s] parents entry to the premises 
without a police officer present.  The house 
was the location of the alleged assault.  In the 
circumstances it was reasonable for the police 
to restrict entry and hence preserve evidence 
until a search in connection with the assault 
was authorized by a search warrant, by 
controlling use of the keys.  I see no wrongful 
action in relation to the keys. [para. 18] 
 
Although the entry and observations made in the 
basement constituted a search, the police actions 
were proper and reasonable. The appeal court 
held: 
 
[The accused’s] consent to enter his home was 
restricted to those areas where his mother 
moved, as the purpose was to preserve 
evidence in relation to the assault 
investigation.  This did not extend to the 
basement.  The question is whether that 
search was unreasonable within the meaning of 
s. 8, and if so, whether the fruits of that 
search should be excluded under. s. 24 of the 
Charter. 
 
The circumstances of the entry included the 
attempted recovery of a Rotweiller dog with 
the intention to lock the house after 
departure.  [The accused’s] mother stated 
that she did not think the cat belonged to the 
house.  She wanted it out.  Someone was 
required to seek out the cat, either to ensure 
that it was provided for in the house or 
otherwise to remove it.  A parent would be 
required to descend to the basement, in which 
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case [the attending officer] was permitted by 
the consent to accompany him or her or he 
would have to go down alone.  It was inevitable 
that the cat’s presence would have drawn the 
police to the basement, exposing the 
accoutrements of the grow operation that 
were in plain view.  And [the attending officer] 
did not go beyond observing that which was in 
plain view.  
 
Although it was contended before us that the 
instruction by [the investigator] to [the 
attending officer] to “keep his eyes open” 
coloured [the attending officer’s] observations 
while in the basement, I do not agree.  Police 
officers are trained observers.  There is, in 
my view, nothing wrong with a reminder to be 
observant.  The question that such a reminder 
raises is whether the observations caused the 
police officer to ‘snoop’ around outside the 
consent, for example, to open doors, drawers 
or cupboards, or rifle among possessions.  The 
facts found by the trial judge do not suggest 
anything of that sort of behaviour.  In the 
result, that admonition adds nothing to the 
understanding of whether the search of the 
basement occasioned by [the attending 
officer] following the cat was unreasonable. 
[paras. 22-24] 
 
The attending officer’s observations of the 
basement were not unreasonable and therefore 
did not offend s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
It cannot be denied that police officers must 
confront many frustrating individuals and 
situations in the course of performing their 
duties…Society has invested in its police officers 
a special authority to deal with individual 
members of that society, a special position of 
trust…But there is a reciprocal expectation that 
police officers who are invested with substantial 
rights of interference with individual liberties, 
exercise those rights with scrupulous 
propriety44—British Columbia Provincial Court 
Justice Weitzel 
                                                 
44 R. v. Cronmiller et al, 2004 BCPC 1 
ETHICS & CHARACTER  
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
POLICE ACADEMY WORKSHOP 
 
 
Location: 
 
Justice Institute of British Columbia 
715 McBride Blvd. New Westminster, BC 
 
Date: 
 
March 1, 2004 
0900-1630 
 
Registration Fee: 
  
$150  
includes two catered breaks and a 
light lunch  
 
Keynote Speakers: 
 
Dr. Edwin Delattre, author 
 “ Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing”  
 
Dr. Michael Caldero, co-author 
“ Police Ethics: The Corruption of Noble 
Cause”  
 
Topics: 
 
Values-based decision making 
Recruitment, hiring and selection 
Training 
Noble cause corruption 
Racial profiling 
 
 
Please check the Justice Institute of B.C. 
website for more information and details at 
www.jibc.bc.ca 
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